The Yomiuri Shimbun
This is the fifth installment in a series focusing on delays in implementing emergency steps by the government and Tokyo Electric Power Co. to deal with the unprecedented nuclear crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.
Many countries have grown frustrated with and distrustful of the Japanese government for its poor handling of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant crisis and its failure to disclose relevant information after the earthquake and tsunami of March 11.
What countermeasures will Japan take against tsunami in the future? Also, we need to know the exact details of what's happening with the reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear plant.
These were just a couple of the grueling questions thrown at the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency's Deputy Director General for Nuclear Safety, Koichiro Nakamura, at a small-group session of a review meeting for contracting parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Vienna on April 6.
The session was held to check Japan's compliance with the terms of the treaty. In addition to representatives from the group's 12 member countries, about 200 international representatives and experts attended--an unusually large number.
According to some participants, Japan failed to respond clearly to questions and initially described the situation at the nuclear plant as under control. This remark was later corrected to "We're trying to control it," and "We don't know [exactly what is happening inside the nuclear reactors]."
"I doubt any of the foreign participants were satisfied with Japan's explanation," said a visibly disappointed European diplomat.
A Russian expert was more critical, saying: "If nuclear plants are built on the coast, it's foreseeable that a major tsunami could occur. Despite being a technologically advanced nation, Japan has no robots that can be used at nuclear plants!"
Another European expert described Japan's initial handling of the crisis as problematic, saying, "Damage to one of the reactors may have been less severe if initial measures, such as opening a hole in the reactor building, were taken to prevent hydrogen explosions."
South Korean experts were the most disgruntled. "Despite being neighbors, Japan did not tell us beforehand that it would be discharging contaminated water into the sea. Communication on disaster relief and assistance between [South Korea and Japan] is not good enough," he said.
Tokyo's failure to give Seoul advance warning about discharging radioactive water into the sea became a political issue within South Korea. When a plenary meeting of an extraordinary session of the National Assembly was held in Seoul on April 7, Prime Minister Kim Hwang Sik was questioned by an independent assembly member over the issue. Kim, raising his voice, responded: "I would like to remind you it's not our government that's incompetent. It's the Japanese government."
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U.S. critical of Japan
There have also been indications that the United States was critical toward the Prime Minister Naoto Kan's administration for its handling of the nuclear crisis.
Apparently John Roos, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, was at times annoyed with the lack of detailed information coming from Japan.
At one point his embassy had difficulty finding out exactly whom to contact over the issue--Tokyo Electric Power Co., the Prime Minister's Office, or concerned ministries--and was therefore unable to determine the assistance Japan needed.
Roos tried to collect relevant information by phoning Chief Cabinet Secretary Yukio Edano, Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda and other Democratic Party of Japan Diet members he knew personally.
The United States even attempted to gather information independently using a spy satellite and an unmanned surveillance plane, a Global Hawk, possibly indicating a lack of confidence in the Japanese government.
A visiting expert from the U.S. government's Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was reportedly frustrated with Akihisa Nagashima, a former parliamentary secretary of the Defense Ministry and now a DPJ member in the House of Representatives. At a meeting at TEPCO's head office in Tokyo on March 18, the expert allegedly told Nagashima it was unclear who was actually in charge of managing the crisis.
Yet bilateral cooperation on dealing with the crisis later improved.
On March 20, Kan responded to a request by Nagashima and approved setting up a panel to coordinate views between the two countries.
The panel first convened on March 22 at a governmental facility near the Prime Minister's Office. Defense leaders from both countries, who were already in existing talks, were assigned to work together on relevant issues. At this stage more than 10 days had passed since the original disaster.
The panel initially held daily meetings but has since rescheduled these for every other day. Their duration was later halved from one hour to 30 minutes, indicating some progress has been made in sharing information.
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Danger hampering cooperation
Cooperation with other countries has not been running so smoothly. The reality is that despite the advances made by many countries in generating nuclear power, no one has a miracle cure for bringing the crisis at the Fukushima nuclear plant under control.
About 20 experts from Areva SA, a French major nuclear reactor maker, arrived in Japan and are now stationed at joint task force headquarters set up at TEPCO and other places.
Since Areva has already operated nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, it is expected to provide TEPCO with the technology to remove contaminated water from the reactors.
Yet according to a TEPCO official, Areva has been unable to act. "It is unsafe for workers because radiation levels [near the nuclear reactors] are too high," he said.
Anne Lauvergeon, chief executive officer of Areva, described the situation as both complicated and unprecedented. She noted the outlook for the plant seemed dismal and that the top priority was to find out what was going on.
(Apr. 16, 2011)
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