28/09 Govt N-liability fund may take over TEPCO

The Yomiuri Shimbun

The government's nuclear damage liability fund, which began operation Monday, may put Tokyo Electric Power Co. under its control because costs to decommission reactors at the crisis-hit Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant are expected to reach several trillion yen.

Former Hitotsubashi University President Takehiko Sugiyama, who became head of the organization on Monday, told a press conference the entity would inject capital into TEPCO and put the utility under public management when the decommissioning costs reach an extremely high level.

Although Sugiyama said the final cost of the decommissioning work is not yet known, he made clear a capital injection by his organization "will be necessary."

The corporation was established to support TEPCO's payment of compensation for damages resulting from the crisis, including those from the spread of radioactive material from the power plant.

Despite the expected costs of several trillion yen for decommissioning the Fukushima No. 1 plant's reactors, TEPCO has only about 1 trillion yen of its own capital.

Therefore, if the company bears the burden only by itself, it is almost certain that its liabilities will exceed its assets.

In this regard, Economy, Trade and Industry Minister Yukio Edano said, "TEPCO has no competition at present [because of its regional monopoly] and profits are surely secured. It is natural that [pay for executives and employees] must be decided in a way similar to that of public employees and staffers at independent administrative institutions."

He was essentially calling on TEPCO to step up efforts to reduce its personnel costs.

Meanwhile, TEPCO President Toshio Nishizawa suggested the firm would study an additional restructuring program, saying "We're not in a situation to consider raising electricity rates."

The company earlier sought an opinion from the government's TEPCO Management and Finance Investigation Committee on a charge hike.

TEPCO and the fund will compile a special program plan in October, which will feature restructuring programs. If Edano does not approve the plan, the government will not extend capital assistance to the firm.

===

Severe programs expected

Sugiyama, the head of the fund's board of directors, emphasized at his press conference, "It is important for us to carefully understand how victims feel now."

In October the fund will establish a local office in Koriyama, Fukushima Prefecture, to answer questions from the victims.

A major focus in terms of TEPCO's management issues will be restructuring programs to be included in the special business project plan that the fund will compile jointly with the utility.

Edano, who will decide whether the government will accept the plan, intends to ask TEPCO to make thorough cuts in expenses, including personnel costs, saying the company's executive and employee pay should be significantly lowered.

Sugiyama also took a stance of not allowing an easy increase in power charges. He said the current system, which allows power companies to decide electricity charges by adding profits onto their actual power generation costs, needs to be reviewed.

With the launch of the fund, worries over how TEPCO will raise money to pay compensation are somewhat eased.

Sugiyama put the amount of necessary money for immediate compensation payments at 3 trillion yen to 4 trillion yen. This amount of money is to be provided by the fund to TEPCO.

However, no money from the fund can be used for decommissioning reactors. Therefore, it is almost certain that the company's liabilities will exceed its assets.

For this reason, Sugiyama thinks it necessary to put TEPCO under public control.

(Sep. 28, 2011)

05/05 空と海を汚染…鳩山前首相、中国副主席に陳謝

　【北京＝今井隆】民主党の鳩山前首相は５日、中国の習近平国家副主席と北京の釣魚台国賓館で会談した。

　鳩山氏は東京電力福島第一原子力発電所の事故について、「空と海が毎日汚染されてしまっていることを申し訳なく思う」と陳謝した。中国の東日本大震災に対する支援には謝意を伝えた。

　習氏は「日本人が（震災の中でも）大変秩序正しく頑張っていることに感銘を受けた」と述べる一方で、原発事故に関しては「一刻も早くこの問題を解決していただきたい」と注文をつけた。日本の農産物についても「絶対に大丈夫だという保証を出してほしい。中国政府が大丈夫だと言っても、中国国民がどう受け取るかは別だ」と指摘した。

（2011年5月5日23時41分 読売新聞）

22/04 South Korea suspends Kori reactor operations

BY AKIRA NAKANO STAFF WRITER
2011/04/22

Lee Chae-won, who lives near the Kori nuclear power plant in Busan (Akira Nakano)

SEOUL--The operator of South Korea's Kori nuclear power plant has suspended operation of its oldest reactor because of public concerns about safety in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan.

The plant's No. 1 reactor has been offline since April 12 due to an electrical malfunction. Its operator, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. (KHNP), decided April 20 not to restart power generation because of public unease.

Kim Jong-shin, president of KHNP, told a news conference: "The people have anxieties and doubts about the safety of the (No. 1) reactor. Some are calling for the decommissioning of the reactor. In the light of those opinions, we decided to invite a more detailed inspection from the government."

According to the Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety, which is responsible for inspecting nuclear power plants, circuit breakers in the reactor malfunctioned April 12. Similar defects and design faults were found in other breakers, the institute said.

There was a separate incident at the plant's No. 4 reactor April 19, when a worker cut an electrical connection by accident. An emergency backup electric supply kicked in and there was no damage to the reactor, but two workers suffered burns.

The No. 1 reactor of Kori nuclear power plant started operation in 1978. It was South Korea's first industrial nuclear reactor. Since 2008, it has been operating beyond the 30-year life span envisaged when it was built. The Kori nuclear power plant has five reactors.

After the accidents at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, 97 local residents petitioned Busan district court April 12 to halt the No. 1 reactor. By coincidence, operations were suspended later the same day because of the electrical malfunction.

20/04 迅速な事故対応の重要性確認 原子力安全サミット閉幕

2011年4月20日12時16分

　旧ソ連・ウクライナのチェルノブイリ原発事故から２５年となる２６日を前に、約５０の国・機構が参加して首都キエフで開かれた原子力安全サミットは１９日、福島第一原発事故での日本の対応を念頭に、「大規模な自然災害による原発事故では迅速な対応が重要だ」とする宣言を採択、閉幕した。

　宣言はまた、既存の原発に安全維持のための検査を促していくことを確認。現在、約７０カ国・機構にとどまる原子力安全条約の締約国を増やすことでも一致した。（キエフ＝玉川透）

20/04 浜岡原発・もんじゅ、緊急時の安全対策報告 経産省に

2011年4月20日23時42分

　中部電力と日本原子力研究開発機構は２０日、浜岡原子力発電所（静岡県御前崎市）、高速増殖原型炉もんじゅ（福井県敦賀市）について、電源車の配備や緊急時の手順の確認などをまとめた緊急安全対策を経済産業省に報告した。

　浜岡原発は東海地震の想定震源域にある。中部電力は、事故で原子炉の圧力が上がった場合、蒸気を外に放出するベント（排気）作業を手動で行うなど、緊急時の手順を再確認した。

　もんじゅは一般的な原発と違い、水のかわりにナトリウムを冷却材に使い、炉心の熱を逃がす。計器に電源車のケーブルをつなぐ訓練などを行った。

　経産省原子力安全・保安院は今後、立ち入り検査などをして、４月中に妥当性を判断する。

20/04 チェルノブイリ事故２５年 各国首脳「原発安全強化を」

チェルノブイリ原発事故で全住民が避難したプリピャチ。事故当時は開園直前だった遊園地の乗り物はさび付き、あちこちで草木が生えていた＝１８日、関根写す

　旧ソ連・ウクライナのチェルノブイリ原発事故から２５年となる２６日を前に、各国が首脳級で原発の安全性などを協議する原子力安全サミットが１９日、首都キエフで開かれた。福島第一原発の事故を受け、原発の安全基準強化を求める発言が各国から相次いだ。

　フランスのフィヨン首相ら首脳級を含む約５０の国・機構の代表が参加した。

　潘基文（パン・ギムン）・国連事務総長は演説で「最高の技術を持つと思われていた日本で悲劇的な事故が起きた」と指摘。この事故を教訓とし、各国が責任を持って津波などに対する安全対策を講じるべきだと強調した。

　欧州連合（ＥＵ）のバローゾ欧州委員長も「原発の安全基準強化が各国の最優先課題だ」と指摘。カザフスタンのナザルバエフ大統領は、新たに原発を導入する国々にも「新しいアプローチが必要だ」と述べた。

　日本からは高橋千秋外務副大臣が参加し、福島第一原発の現状や事故の経緯などについて報告する。

　１９日午前には、チェルノブイリ事故の今後の長期的対策を主要８カ国（Ｇ８）がウクライナと話し合う支援国会合があった。チェルノブイリでは、２５年前に原子炉からの放射能を封じ込めたコンクリート製「石棺」の老朽化対策が急務。ウクライナのヤヌコビッチ大統領は会合後、少なくとも５億５千万ユーロ（約６５０億円）の拠出が確約されたと発表した。

　チェルノブイリ原発事故は１９８６年４月２６日に発生。原発から半径３０キロ圏内では、現在でも居住などが禁止されている。（キエフ＝玉川透）

19/04 文科省、学校活動上の放射線量の安全基準を発表

　東京電力福島第一原発事故を受け、文部科学省は１９日、学校活動上の放射線量の安全基準を発表した。

　夏休みが終了するまでの暫定基準として、校庭の放射線量が１時間あたり３・８マイクロ・シーベルト以上の場合は屋外活動を制限し、屋内活動を中心にするなどとした。原子力安全委員会は、「放射線量が高い学校では継続的に測定すること、その他の学校も簡易型線量計を１台配置し線量変化を確認するよう助言した」としている。

　安全委によると、基準は、児童生徒の年間被曝ひばく線量の上限を２０ミリ・シーベルトとし〈１〉現在の放射線量が今後も継続〈２〉１日の屋外活動は８時間〈３〉残りは木造家屋内で過ごす――との想定で算出した。

（2011年4月19日20時06分 読売新聞）

13/04 玄海原発、地元町長が再開容認 説明会など条件に 佐賀

2011年4月13日23時10分

　定期検査中の九州電力玄海原子力発電所（佐賀県玄海町）２、３号機の運転再開について、同町の岸本英雄町長は１３日、朝日新聞の取材に対し、「運転を再開できずに夏を迎えれば、九州も節電や計画停電が必要になる。クリアすべきことをクリアすれば、５月中に再開するのが好ましい」と述べ、早期の運転再開を認める考えを示した。

　岸本町長は、九電が１２日に公開した安全対策の訓練を「運転再開への一歩」と評価。その上で、台風やテロなどを想定したシミュレーションを実施するよう九電に要請していた。岸本町長は１３日の取材に、住民や議会を対象にした説明会の開催を求め、これらがクリアされれば、運転再開を容認する考えを示した。

　一方、佐賀県の古川康知事は同日、朝日新聞の取材に対し、「国の安全対策が見えない中で、再開うんぬんの話ではない。（原発の安全対策についての）国の考え方や方針が県民に説明できるものなのかどうかで判断すべきだ」と述べた。古川知事は１１日の記者会見で「（国の安全基準を）クリアしてさえいれば（再開して）良いというわけではない」と話していた。

　九電は５月中の営業運転の再開を目指し、緊急安全対策の取り組み状況を、週内にも国に報告する。その上で、地元の代表者らを対象にした説明会を開く意向だ。

12/04 Heroes and realists found among the brave "Fukushima 700"

2011/04/12

The second floor in the basement of a waste disposal facility at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant remains flooded with about 30 centimeters of water on Friday. The disposal facility will be used to store highly contaminated water. (Provided by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)

Editor's note: We will update our earthquake news as frequently as possible on AJW's Facebook page: http://www.facebook.com/AJW.Asahi. Please check the latest developments in this disaster. From Toshio Jo, managing editor, International Division, The Asahi Shimbun.

* * *

Although lionized as the "Fukushima 50" by the foreign media, there are in fact about 700 workers engaged in the daily struggle with the "invisible enemy" at the crippled Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant.

A month has passed in the dangerous and lonely efforts to resolve the crisis at the nuclear plant, and still, there is no end in sight. There are many tales emerging of the unselfishness and bravery of these workers, while others take a more realistic view of why they are risking their lives amid high radiation levels to cool down the plant's overheating fuel rods.

A man in his 40s, who was dispatched to Fukushima No. 1 from a partner of the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO), said, "I did not want to go there. But if I reject the request, I will lose my job."

The daily pay is less than 20,000 yen ($236).

"I hear some construction workers were employed at a wage of several tens of thousands of yen per hour. But we are working on a conventional daily wage as our company has had cooperative relationships with TEPCO," the man said.

Meanwhile, many of the man's colleagues volunteered to go into the plant, saying, "We are the only workers (that can do the job)." Because of that gung-ho spirit, they share a sense of solidarity, the man added.

At one of the plant's subcontractors, the president and elderly executives volunteered, hoping that they would be chosen instead of younger workers, because they were worried about the long-term health effects on them.

"Even we can do simple work, such as laying cables," one of the elderly executives said.

Immediately after the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake, the number of TEPCO employees and others from the firm's business partners, such as Toshiba Corp. and Hitachi Ltd., at Fukushima No. 1 totaled more than 700. After an explosion took place at a building housing the No. 2 reactor on March 15, however, most of them evacuated. Only about 70 workers remained and continued the recovery work.

Their number was initially announced as 50. Because of that, foreign media labeled them the "Fukushima 50," and the heroic tag stuck.

Today, the more accurate "Fukushima 700" at the plant are classified into such groups as "recovery," "information," "medical service" and "security."

When the crisis began in mid-March, many workers stayed in the plant's compound for more than 10 days in a row. At present, they are working in alternate shifts, taking two days off at a time.

This month, a TEPCO employee living in the Tokyo metropolitan area told his wife, "I may have to go (to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant) again."

He went to the plant several days after the earthquake and continued to stay there. Recently, he was allowed to return home. Even at his office in Tokyo, however, he is working from early in the morning to midnight every day, and there is little time to talk with family members.

"Even if you have no health problems now, will you be in good health in the future?" his concerned wife asked him.

Meanwhile, heated exchanges took place during a meeting of a group company of Hitachi, immediately after the nuclear crisis began.

An employee of the section in charge of the recovery work at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant challenged an employee in charge of engineering management: "How many workers can you send (to the nuclear plant)? Show us your determination."

To resolve the crisis, the employee urged the latter to share in the on-site work at the nuclear plant instead of issuing orders from a safe distance. As a result of the discussion, many engineers went into the nuclear plant.

A mid-level executive of the company recalled, "It was a difficult decision," as the job could endanger the lives of the workers.

What workers found at Fukushima No. 1 in the beginning was a lack of adequate safety equipment and spartan living conditions.

At the start of the nuclear crisis, there was an insufficient number of dosimeters to measure radiation levels. Because of that, about 180 workers were engaged in the recovery work without them.

Their living conditions were poor. They had only hard biscuits and vegetable juice in the morning and canned food and emergency rice at night. They slept on floors during their shifts.

Currently, the workers have meals three times a day, and some can stay at facilities located away from the plant. According to TEPCO sources, every worker now has access to a dosimeter.

However, many workers say that they may have already been exposed to much radiation.

In late March, the radiation level rose in a building that is serving as the headquarters of the recovery work efforts, alarming the workers.

The building is equipped with an air-conditioning system that does not let in outside air and the walls are also thick. TEPCO has additionally replaced filters for air ventilation with new ones. It also installed 77 lead-covered boards on windows to prevent gamma rays from entering the building,

An employee of a company that has dispatched its workers to the Fukushima plant added, "We want to make the dispatched workers wear lead-lined suits."

The Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant had "whole body counters," which measures "internal exposure," or level of radiation in the human body. However, those counters were rendered useless due to damage from the earthquake and subsequent tsunami. The internal exposure is now measured by inspection vehicles.

Despite the precautions for worker safety at Fukushima No. 1, there is concern.

"Some workers may have radiation-caused symptoms after several years," said Atsushi Suzuki, a lawyer who previously handled a labor disaster compensation issue for a nuclear power plant worker.

Suzuki represented a man who worked at the Fukushima No. 1 plant from 1977 to 1982 as a plumber and on other jobs.

After he left the workplace, he was diagnosed as suffering from multiple myeloma, a deadly bone marrow cancer. He died in 2007.

The man was recognized to have died from exposure to radiation. In a suit seeking compensation, however, TEPCO did not acknowledge its responsibility. As a result, his demand for compensation was rejected.

"It is extremely difficult to prove scientifically the cause-and-effect-relationship between exposure to radiation and a disease that broke out later," Suzuki said. "I think that people currently engaged in recovery work (at the Fukushima No. 1 plant) do not have the leeway to prevent exposure to radiation by themselves. It is necessary for the government and TEPCO to fully consider sufficient prevention measures and compensation (to those who suffered radiation-caused diseases)."

(This article was written by Manabu Sasaki, Hiroyoshi Itabashi, Hiroaki Kojima and Ryujiro Komatsu.)

10/04 Đoàn Việt Nam tham gia Hội nghị đánh giá lần thứ 5 của Công ước An toàn hạt nhân

Từ ngày 4-14/4/2011, được sự chỉ đạo của Thủ tướng Chính phủ, theo ủy nhiệm thư của Bộ Ngoại giao, Đoàn Việt Nam do TS. Nguyễn Nữ Hoài Vi , Trưởng phòng Kiểm soát hạt nhân, Cục An toàn bức xạ và hạt nhân (ATBXHN) làm Trưởng đoàn đã tham dự Hội nghị đánh giá lần thứ 5 của Công ước An toàn hạt nhân tại Viên, Áo.

08:03' PM - Thứ sáu, 08/04/2011

Tham dự Đoàn còn có TS. Nguyễn Bá Sơn- Đại sứ, Trưởng Phái đoàn thường trực Việt Nam cạnh các Tổ chức Liên hợp quốc và các tổ chức quốc tế khác tại Viên, CH Áo và ThS. Nguyễn An Trung - Trưởng phòng Hợp tác quốc tế, Cục ATBXHN. Việt Nam đã chính thức trở thành quốc gia thành viên của Công ước từ tháng 7/2010 và ngày 10/8/2010, Việt Nam đã gửi báo cáo quốc gia đầu tiên theo quy định của Công ước. Mặc dù tới thời điểm này Việt Nam chưa có cơ sở hạt nhân trong phạm vi điều chỉnh của Công ước, nhưng với một chương trình phát triển điện hạt nhân ấn tượng đối với một quốc gia mới, báo cáo của Đoàn Việt Nam nhận được sự quan tâm đáng kể của các quốc gia thành viên. Báo cáo tại Hội nghị, Đoàn Việt Nam đã khẳng định những nỗ lực đã thực hiện cũng như chỉ ra những thách thức, trong việc đưa nhà máy điện hạt nhân (NMĐHN) đầu tiên của Việt Nam vào hoạt động một cách an toàn, hiệu quả để tạo tiền đề cho lộ trình phát triển điện hạt nhân và tạo niềm tin với cộng đồng năng lượng nguyên tử quốc tế. Đặc biệt với những hậu quả của tai nạn hạt nhân đang tiếp tục diễn biến tại NMĐHN Fukushima Daiichi của Nhật Bản, Đoàn Việt Nam đã khẳng định việc ưu tiên tập trung thu thập thông tin, phân tích các bài học được các chuyên gia hạt nhân quốc tế đúc rút để có những kinh nghiệm quý giá trong việc đảm bảo an toàn xây dựng NMĐHN ngay tại giai đoạn lựa chọn và phê duyệt địa điểm cho NMĐHN đầu tiên của Việt Nam. Qua báo cáo của Đoàn Việt Nam, Hội nghị đã đánh giá cao những nỗ lực của Việt Nam trong chương trình phát triển điện hạt nhân của mình, đặc biệt việc nâng cao vị thế, vai trò và năng lực của cơ quan pháp quy về an toàn bức xạ và hạt nhân trong khu vực và trên trường quốc tế. Trong thời gian diễn ra Hội nghị, Đoàn Việt Nam cũng đã tham gia Hội nghị bên lề về “Tai nạn Fukushima Daiichi và các biện pháp đảm bảo an toàn đầu tiên trên thế giới”. Công ước An toàn hạt nhân, có hiệu lực từ ngày 24/10/1996, được lập ra để tăng cường vấn đề an toàn hạt nhân. Mục tiêu của Công ước là đạt được và duy trì an toàn hạt nhân ở mức độ cao trên toàn thế giới, thiết lập và duy trì việc bảo vệ hiệu quả các cơ sở hạt nhân chống lại các nguy hiểm phóng xạ có thể, và ngăn ngừa các tai nạn phóng xạ. Công ước An toàn hạt nhân không mang tính cưỡng chế, mà khuyến khích các bên tuân thủ các tiêu chuẩn an toàn được quốc tế công nhận, dựa trên lợi ích chung để đạt được cấp độ an toàn cao hơn. Định kỳ 3 năm, các quốc gia thành viên của Công ước sẽ nhóm họp để xem xét việc thực hiện Công ước và thảo luận về báo cáo của các quốc gia về an toàn hạt nhân mà mỗi Bên ký kết có nghĩa vụ phải trình. Tất cả các quốc gia có nhà máy điện hạt nhân đang hoạt động đều là các quốc gia thành viên của Công ước. Nguồn: An Trung, Cục An toàn bức xạ và hạt nhân

Bài mới:

Thông tin tình hình sự cố Nhà máy điện hạt nhân Fukushima I Nhật Bản (từ ngày 09/4 đến khoảng 15:00 ngày 10/4/2011)
10/04/2011 06:47' PM

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10/04 TEPCO contractors reject higher radiation dose limit for workers

In this photo released by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, Tokyo Electric Power Co. workers collect data in the control room for Unit 1 and Unit 2 at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okumamachi, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Wednesday, March 23, 2011.

TOKYO (Kyodo) -- Companies dispatching workers to Tokyo Electric Power Co.'s crippled Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant are refusing to adopt the government-imposed provisional limit on radiation exposure for those workers at the plant, saying it would not be accepted by those at the site, Kyodo News learned Saturday.

The limit was lifted from 100 millisieverts to 250 millisieverts in an announcement made March 15 by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare at the request of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which has the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency under its wing, and other bodies.

The increase was requested to enable workers to engage in longer hours of assignments and to secure more workers who meet the restriction.

The advisability of the hastily decided limit may be called into question as workers have to handle a wider range of work over an extended period of time. They are now faced with tasks such as removing rubble and disposing of contaminated water in addition to their initial job of restoring the lost power sources at the plant that was crippled by the March 11 quake and tsunami.

The contract companies say they are sticking to the previous limit.

The health ministry said, "Based on medical expertise, a maximum limit has been adopted that would not cause health damage such as a temporary decline in white blood cell count." The ministry's decision was made after consulting with the science ministry's advisory body Radiation Council.

In this photo released by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, Tokyo Electric Power Co. workers collect data in the control room for Unit 1 and Unit 2 at the tsunami-crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Okumamachi, Fukushima Prefecture, Japan, Wednesday, March 23, 2011.

The ministry said it referenced a view of the International Commission on Radiological Protection that sets the upper limit in an emergency situation to a dose of 500-1,000 millisieverts.

The limit was upheld at 100 millisieverts when Japan was faced with a serious accident at a nuclear fuel processing plant in 1999 in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture.

According to Tokyo Electric, 21 workers were exposed to a cumulative dose of more than 100 millisieverts as of April 1. On March 24, three workers from Kandenko Co. and a subcontractor were exposed to high doses of radiation during their work at a building close to a reactor, making employers of plant workers nervous.

A public relations officer at Kandenko, a TEPCO affiliate, said, "Those at work sites would not agree to accept a suddenly lifted" limit. The three in question were exposed to 173-180 millisieverts and two of them suffered burns to their feet.

"We have to be prudent. Considering safety, we will maintain the 100 millisievert limit," the officer said.

An official at Tokyo Energy & Systems Inc., a TEPCO subsidiary, said, "The control target rate at the site is 100 millisieverts. In practice, we have set a limit lower at 80 millisieverts to make room for controlling radiation exposure."

Construction companies Kajima Corp. and Taisei Corp. have also adopted 100 millisieverts as their yardsticks.

Workers are pictured at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant on March 23. (Photograph courtesy of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)

Hitachi Ltd. has adopted "200 millisieverts under an in-house regulation," a public relations official said.

TEPCO has been going along with the higher limit. Just days ago, however, it was disclosed that not all its workers were equipped with radiation monitors due to shortages of units with alarms.

(Mainichi Japan) April 10, 2011

07/04 Fukushima No. 1 plant designed on 'trial-and-error' basis

2011/04/07

An aerial view of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant taken Tuesday from a helicopter flying at about 7,300 meters and about 38 kilometers to the west. (Eiji Hori)

While changes improved safety at the Fukushima No. 2 nuclear power plant, overconfidence, complacency and high costs stymied such action at the now-crippled Fukushima No. 1 plant, according to people familiar with the situation.

The difference in the safety designs was the main reason why the crisis continues to unfold at the Fukushima No. 1 plant--one of the oldest in Japan--while the No. 2 plant a few kilometers south remains relatively unscathed by the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami.

Officials at another Tokyo Electric Power Co. nuclear plant in Kashiwazaki-Kariwa, Niigata Prefecture, analyzed the differences in safety designs at the two Fukushima plants.

According to their analysis and TEPCO sources, there are clear differences in safety levels between the two plants concerning power source equipment, such as emergency diesel generators and transformers at the reactor cores, and pumps used to bring in seawater to remove residual heat from the cores.

TEPCO documents show that the emergency diesel generators located in the turbine buildings at the Fukushima No. 1 plant were flooded by the tsunami and rendered inoperable, except for the one at the No. 6 reactor. This effectively disabled the cooling mechanisms.

After the No. 1 plant lost its power sources, the reactor cores became much more difficult to control, leading to serious problems, including hydrogen explosions that damaged the housing of the reactors.

Radioactive materials have also been emitted from the damaged reactors.

No such problems have been encountered at the No. 2 plant.

The emergency generators at the No. 2 plant were in buildings housing the reactor cores. Because the reactor buildings are much more airtight, the generators at the No. 2 plant continued to function after the tsunami struck.

Emergency generators are also located within the airtight reactor core buildings at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, which has similar design features to the Fukushima No. 2 plant.

When asked about the differences in the safety designs between the No. 1 and No. 2 plants, an official at TEPCO headquarters said: "This does not mean we have admitted that a problem exists. We will conduct further detailed studies to identify the problems."

The No. 1 plant was built in the 1960s and 1970s. Improvement work was conducted in the 1970s and 1980s to strengthen its resistance to earthquakes.

A nuclear engineer who used to work for TEPCO and was involved in those improvements said no consideration was paid to the location of the emergency diesel generators or the seawater pumps.

"First of all, there was the judgment that the reactor core buildings were in a safe location in relation to the expected height of any tsunami that might strike the plant," the engineer said. "However, even if they wanted to move the generators, there was no space within the reactor building, so that would have meant a major revision in design.

"At the time, no one considered making such changes," the engineer said.

Both the No. 1 and No. 2 nuclear plants were hit by waves more than 14 meters high, well above the expected limits of 5.7 to 5.2 meters estimated in safety designs.

The tsunami rendered inoperable all of the No. 1 plant's pumps, which were also not located within a sealed structure.

Although the pumps at the No. 2 plant were inside buildings, the tsunami crippled the ones to the No. 1, No. 2 and No. 4 reactors. But the pump at the No. 3 reactor continued to cool the reactor core.

Referring to the possibility of installing the seawater pumps inside buildings, the former TEPCO engineer said, "It would have been a major project because various pipes are laid out under the pumps, and so all of that would also have had to be moved."

A midlevel TEPCO official also said money was a big reason why repairs and changes to the No. 1 plant were not made.

"The blueprints for the reactor cores at the No. 1 plant were bought 'as is' by Toshiba Corp. from General Electric Co., so the priority at that time was on constructing the reactors according to those blueprints," the official said.

When the Fukushima No. 1 plant was being built, Japan was importing technology from the United States and learning from a more advanced nuclear power nation.

The No. 1 plant was considered a "learning experience."

A former TEPCO executive said, "The Fukushima No. 1 plant was a practice course for Toshiba and Hitachi Ltd. to learn about GE's design on a trial-and-error basis."

With the exception of the No. 6 reactor, the other five reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 plant are Mark I boiling-water reactors developed by GE.

According to sources, the locations of emergency generators and the seawater pump structure were also based on a GE design.

In contrast, the No. 6 reactor is a Mark II reactor. Moreover, the Fukushima No. 2 plant and Kashiwazaki-Kariwa plant, which were constructed from the mid-1970s to the 1990s, used an improved and safer version of the Mark II reactor.

After Toshiba and Hitachi gained experience in constructing nuclear plants, they located emergency generators and seawater pumps within buildings.

Yet those safety improvements were never reflected in changes at the Fukushima No. 1 plant.

Other TEPCO officials said that changing the anti-tsunami design or moving the location of the emergency generators would have been an acknowledgment that previous decisions were insufficient.

Kiyoshi Sakurai, a commentator on technology issues, said that relying on a GE design also put the Fukushima No. 1 plant at a disadvantage because U.S. designers were not as cautious about earthquakes and tsunami as those working in Japan.

01/04 Govt should welcome French nuclear help

The Yomiuri Shimbun

Visiting French President Nicolas Sarkozy on Thursday discussed with Prime Minister Naoto Kan measures to deal with the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, which was crippled by the March 11 Tohoku Pacific Offshore Earthquake. Sarkozy assured Kan the international community will unite to support Japan in its recovery from the extensive damage suffered in the disaster.

Kan and Sarkozy also agreed the nuclear accident will be on the agenda at the Group of Eight summit talks scheduled in late May.

Countries around the world are watching how Japan deals with the nuclear accident. Armed with the cooperation of France, which has many nuclear plants, the Japanese government should do its utmost to achieve the top priority--restoring the cooling functions of the nuclear reactors.

The French president visited Japan on his way home from an international seminar in China. As Sarkozy is also the chair of the G-8 and the Group of 20 leading industrialized and emerging economies, his visit also aimed at emphasizing that the international community as a whole should jointly work on measures to deal with disasters such as a massive earthquake and tsunami or a nuclear power plant crisis.

===

Sarkozy an N-power enthusiast

Frustration with Japan's inability so far to bring the nuclear situation completely under control might also have prompted the French president to visit Tokyo at a time when the Japanese government is clearly very busy dealing with the disaster.

France has the world's second-largest number of nuclear power plants in operation after the United States and depends on them for about 80 percent of its power generation. Sarkozy himself is eager to develop new markets for French nuclear power plants. He has tried to sell his country's nuclear reactors in India and the Middle East.

The French president emphasized at a press conference after the talks with Kan that development of nuclear power plants will never stop in spite of the problems in Fukushima Prefecture. Sarkozy also said he aimed to see new international safety standards on nuclear plants drafted by the end of this year through the G-8 summit talks and other international conferences.

He is apparently concerned that the current trouble might fuel movements against nuclear power generation around the world.

If the nuclear crisis worsens, it might have negative effects on France's nuclear-based energy policy.

Sarkozy also said France would like to offer Japan robots that can work in areas contaminated with radiation. Such robots could be used to carry out tasks that would otherwise involve exposing human workers to dangerous radiation levels.

===

An international effort

The chief of nuclear power company Areva SA and a team of experts in the disposal of radioactive water also came to Japan from France.

A joint liaison and coordination council has already been established between Japan and its ally the United States. Under the council, task forces including experts of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission have been working on measures to get the nuclear situation under control as soon as possible.

The government and Tokyo Electric Power Co., the operator of the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant, should coordinate closely with each other to utilize assistance from abroad more efficiently.

"We are obliged to share this experience accurately with countries all over the world," said Kan. This is correct: The government must transmit information on the nuclear crisis accurately and speedily.

We hope that by bringing together the wisdom of the international community, a way can be found to overcome the crisis as soon as possible.

(From The Yomiuri Shimbun, April 1, 2011)

(Apr. 2, 2011)

06/04 Japan set to integrate two nuclear units into one powerful regulatory body（英和）

In this March 24, 2011 aerial photo taken by a small unmanned drone and released by AIR PHOTO SERVICE, damaged Unit 3, left, and Unit 4 of the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant are seen in Okumamachi, Fukushima prefecture, northern Japan. (AP Photo/AIR PHOTO SERVICE)

The Japanese government has started considering merging its two nuclear units to form a more powerful body resembling the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to regulate the nation's nuclear power plants in the wake of the crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant.

The envisaged new regulatory body, consisting of nuclear experts, will be completely independent from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, which promotes the nation's energy policy based on nuclear power generation.

Under the plan, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, formed in 2001, will be separated from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and integrated into the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Safety Commission, which was launched in 1978.

Under the current system, the Nuclear Safety Commission examines the safety of nuclear reactors and advises the government in times of nuclear accidents, while the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency deploys nuclear inspectors to nuclear power plants and oversees the operations of nuclear facilities.

But in regards to the crisis at the nuclear power plant in Fukushima, critics say the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency "could not properly supervise the Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO)'s handling of the accident" and the Nuclear Safety Commission "could not fully perform its functions to advise the government."

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency is an external bureau of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and personnel exchanges take place regularly between them, and therefore it has been under fire for "not being able to properly supervise because the promoting side and the regulating side are not clearly separated."

The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency has about 790 staff members including local inspectors and clerical workers, but the experience of nuclear experts at the agency is not as deep as that of power companies, which have a number of employees who have studied nuclear engineering at graduate schools.

"There are inspectors who learn expertise from power companies. That is something like students supervising teachers," said a senior official of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry.

The status of the Nuclear Safety Commission is equal to a government council formed under Article 8 of National Government Organization Law. It has five commissioners who have a thorough knowledge of nuclear power generation and about 100 staff members.

In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was created in 1974 to regulate commercial nuclear power plants and other uses of nuclear materials. It has about 4,000 staff members and its independency from the government is guaranteed by law. Following the NRC model, the government is expected to consider forming a powerful regulatory body resembling the Fair Trade Commission under Article 3 of National Government Organization Law.

Regarding regulations on the safety of nuclear reactors, Mizuho Fukushima, head of the Social Democratic Party, urged Prime Minister Naoto Kan on March 30 to separate the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Kan replied, "It will be discussed in the future."

Click here for the original Japanese story

(Mainichi Japan) April 6, 2011

原子力安全・保安院：経産省から分離…新たな規制機関へ

原子力規制見直しのイメージ

　東京電力の福島第１原発での事故を受け、政府は５日、経済産業省の外局である原子力安全・保安院を同省から切り離し、内閣府の原子力安全委員会と統合させて新たな規制機関を設置する方向で検討に入った。新たな規制機関は、原発を推進する立場の経産省とは完全に分離し、米国の原子力規制委員会（ＮＲＣ）のような強い権限を持った専門家集団としたい考えだ。【三沢耕平】

　◇安全委と統合、原子力規制強化

　実現すれば、１９７８年の安全委設置、０１年の保安院設置に続く、原子力安全体制の抜本的な見直し。

　現行制度では、安全委が原子炉の安全審査や事故時の政府に対する助言を行い、保安院は各原子力施設に保安検査官を配置して事業者を監督する。しかし、今回の事故では、保安院に「東電の事故対応を適切に監督できなかった」、安全委にも「政府に対する助言機能を十分に発揮できなかった」との批判がある。

　保安院は原発を推進する側の経産省（資源エネルギー庁）の外局にあたり、人事交流もある。このため、「推進と規制が厳密に分かれていない状況では、適正な監視はできない」との批判もあった。また、保安院は地方の検査官や事務職も含めて約７９０人の職員を抱えるが、大学院などで原子力工学を学んだ人材がそろう電力会社や原発メーカーに比べれば層が薄い。「電力会社から専門知識を学ぶ検査官もおり、教え子が教師を監督するようなもの」（経産省幹部）との指摘もあった。

　一方、安全委は国家行政組織法８条に基づいて設置される審議会と同等の位置付け。原子力に精通した委員５人とスタッフ約１００人がいる。

　米国では、原子力規制を担う目的で７４年にＮＲＣを設置。法律で政権や他省庁などからの独立性が確保され、約４０００人が勤務。このため政府内では、ＮＲＣにならって国家行政組織法３条に基づく公正取引委員会のような強い権限を持つ規制機関にする案を軸に検討が進む見通しだ。

　原発の安全規制を巡っては、菅直人首相が先月３０日、首相官邸で会談した社民党の福島瑞穂党首から保安院の分離を要請された際に「今後、議論になる」との見方を示した。

05/04 Ex-Fukushima gov. blames headstrong energy policy for nuclear crisis

Ex-Fukushima gov. blames headstrong energy policy for nuclear crisis

Former Fukushima Gov. Eisaku Sato (Mainichi)

The latest crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant was caused not by a natural disaster, but by the national government's nuclear energy program, former Fukushima Gov. Eisaku Sato said in an interview with the Mainichi.

In 2002, following revelations of a company cover-up of problems with its nuclear reactors, then Fukushima Gov. Sato, now 71, retracted permission that had been previously given to Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) to use plutonium and uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in its reactors. As the incident suggests, Sato was vocal about his doubts toward the national government's nuclear energy program during his gubernatorial tenure from 1988 to 2006, but even he believed that the now-stricken nuclear power plant -- currently at the center of what TEPCO has repeatedly called an "unprecedented" state of affairs -- was safe.

"The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) claimed that they were 'double- and triple-checking' for safety, and maintained that there was 'no risk' of a nuclear accident caused by a natural disaster. Considering how far the ministry went in its claims concerning safety, it's only natural that local communities believed them," Sato said.

When accidents and scandals at the Fukushima No. 1 and No. 2 nuclear power plants came to light years earlier, however, Sato had questioned the state of safety control at the plants.

"Legislators and prefectural governments hosting power plants have no say in national nuclear energy policy. The majority of those comprising the subcommittee for long-term planning at the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan have cozy relationships with those in the electric power industry.

"Bureaucrats at METI are the ones who actually devise policy. Whether the policy is good or bad is irrelevant to them. All they care about is carrying out a plan and never backtracking once a decision has been made."

In this March 20, 2011 aerial photo taken by a small unmanned drone and released by AIR PHOTO SERVICE, the crippled Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant is seen in Okumamachi, Fukushima prefecture, northern Japan. From right to left: Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 3. (AP Photo/AIR PHOTO SERVICE)

Asked about recent debates over the possibility of breaking off the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) from METI, Sato argued that it was imperative.

"Between 2002 and 2006, there were 21 cases of nuclear power plant-related problems reported to the Fukushima Prefectural Government by TEPCO insiders. These whistle blowers feared that the information they supplied to NISA would go unaddressed and leak straight to TEPCO," Sato said. "It's been pointed out that the safety of nuclear power plants has only been checked and confirmed on the premise that they will go into operation, and that's because NISA is a part of METI."

As for the trace amounts of plutonium that have recently been detected on the grounds of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, Sato said that they may have come from MOX fuel being used in the plant's No. 3 reactor.

"Some experts had raised safety concerns over pluthermal power generation, but the government just pushed through with its plans," he said.

While the latest crisis has rocked the public's confidence in the nation's nuclear energy program, there is no doubt that the program has brought jobs to many local residents. Sato said he recognized that eliminating nuclear power plants would strip communities of employment, but also suggested that we take a close look at the town of Futaba, where the No. 1 power station is located.

"It was believed that with the establishment of a nuclear power plant within its borders, Futaba would flourish to the end of time. But immediately after the plant was built, the national government began taking steps to build two more reactors there. The town received preferential financial treatment in return, but by 2009, it was deemed in need of swift financial revitalization, and restrictions were placed on how it could handle its funds," Sato said. "We need to take a coolheaded approach when weighing the pros and cons of hosting nuclear power plants."

With TEPCO's announcement that the No. 1 through 4 reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 plant will be decommissioned, the question that has emerged is whether the No. 5 and No. 6 reactors at the plant and the reactors at the nearby No. 2 plant should resume operations. Sato isn't sure what the right answer is.

"I still haven't made up my mind about whether the No. 2 plant should be running again. A nuclear power plant requires an investment of 1 trillion yen per site, and what we decide to do with the No. 2 plant cuts to the very heart of our energy policy."

Click here for the original Japanese story

(Mainichi Japan) April 5, 2011

「天災ではない」佐藤栄佐久・前知事


今回の原発事故を「国の体質が引き起こした」と指摘する佐藤栄佐久氏＝福島県郡山市の佐藤氏の自宅で、松本惇撮影

　福島県知事在職中に、国の原子力政策に疑問を投げかけていた佐藤栄佐久氏（７１）に、東京電力福島第１原子力発電所の事故について聞いた。佐藤氏は「深刻な事態は国の原子力政策が招いたもので、天災によるものではない」と強調した。【岩佐淳士、松本惇】

　－－未曽有の事故に、東京電力は「想定外の事態」と繰り返した。

　◆私でさえ安全と思っていた。経済産業省は「二重三重のチェックをしている」「自然災害による事故も絶対あり得ない」と言っていた。国がそれだけ言えば、地域社会が信用するのは当然だった。

　－－８８～０６年の知事在任時、福島第１、第２原発で事故やトラブル隠しが発覚。安全管理に疑問を唱えていた。

　◆原子力政策は、国会議員や福島のような立地県もタッチできない。政策の基本を定める長期計画策定会議のメンバーの大半は電力関係者の「味方」。政策を実際につくるのは経産省の官僚だ。彼らにとって、良いのか悪いのかは別問題で、一度方針を決めると後戻りしない体質だ。

　－－原子力安全・保安院の経産省からの分離が検討されている。

　◆分離しないといけない。０２～０６年に原発トラブルなどに絡んだ内部告発が、県に２１通も寄せられた。保安院に情報提供しても対応もせずに東電へ情報が流されると、告発者は恐れていた。原発の運転を前提に安全面をチェックしろと指示してきたと指摘されるのも、保安院が経産省の一組織だからだ。

　－－第１原発敷地内からは、微量のプルトニウムも検出された。

　◆３号機で使用中のプルトニウム・ウラン混合酸化物（ＭＯＸ）燃料から出た可能性もある。プルサーマルは、専門家から安全性に懸念の声もあったが、国は推進してきた。

　－－多くの住民が原発関連の仕事に従事してきた現実もある。

　◆原発のない町に帰っても働く場もないという問題は確かにある。ただ、第１原発がある双葉町を見てほしい。原発ができて永久に栄えると思っていたが、すぐに２機増設してほしいという話が出た。財政上の優遇もあったが、０９年には自主的な財政運営が制限される「早期健全化団体」に転落した。原発立地の損得を、冷静に考えるべきだと思う。

　－－東電は、第１原発１～４号機の廃炉を表明した。５、６号機や第２原発はどう扱うべきか。

　◆第２原発を再稼働させるべきかどうか、まだ自分の中で整理ができていない。原発は１カ所の立地点で１兆円の投資となる。原発の扱いは、エネルギー政策の根幹にかかわる問題だから。

　【略歴】さとう・えいさく　日本青年会議所副会頭などを経て８３年参院議員、８８年に福島県知事。５期目途中の０６年県発注工事を巡る汚職事件が表面化し、同１０月に収賄容疑で逮捕された。無罪主張しているが１審、２審では有罪判決が出て、上告中。０２年の東京電力の原発トラブル隠し問題では、原発立地県の知事として、プルサーマル計画への「事前了解」を白紙撤回した。

◆福島第１原発と佐藤栄佐久氏◆

７１年３月　福島第１原発１号機が営業運転開始

８８年９月　佐藤栄佐久氏が福島県知事に初当選

９８年１１月　県と地元２町が福島第１原発３号機でのプルサーマル計画受け入れを表明

０２年８月　東京電力の原発トラブル隠し発覚

　　９月　佐藤氏がプルサーマル計画への事前了解を白紙撤回

０３年１２月　福島、新潟、福井の３県知事が原子力安全・保安院の経済産業省からの分離を国に要請

０６年９月　県発注工事を巡る談合事件で実弟らが逮捕された道義的責任を取り、知事を辞職

　　１０月　佐藤氏が県発注工事を巡る収賄容疑で逮捕される

１０年８月　福島県がプルサーマル計画受け入れ表明

　　１０月　福島第１原発３号機でプルサーマル発電による営業運転を開始

１１年３月　東日本大震災発生