By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Published: December 20, 2011
With the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Iraq, we’re finally going to get the answer to the core question about that country: Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraq is the way Iraq is — a collection of sects and tribes unable to live together except under an iron fist. Now we’re going to get the answer because both the internal iron fist that held Iraq together (Saddam Hussein) and the external iron fist (the U.S. armed forces) have been removed. Now we will see whether Iraqis can govern themselves in a decent manner that will enable their society to progress — or end up with a new iron fist. You have to hope for the best because so much is riding on it, but the early signs are worrying.Related
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Iraq was always a war of choice. As I never bought the argument that Saddam had nukes that had to be taken out, the decision to go to war stemmed, for me, from a different choice: Could we collaborate with the people of Iraq to change the political trajectory of this pivotal state in the heart of the Arab world and help tilt it and the region onto a democratizing track? After 9/11, the idea of helping to change the context of Arab politics and address the root causes of Arab state dysfunction and Islamist terrorism — which were identified in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report as a deficit of freedom, a deficit of knowledge and a deficit of women’s empowerment — seemed to me to be a legitimate strategic choice. But was it a wise choice?My answer is twofold: “No” and “Maybe, sort of, we’ll see.”I say “no” because whatever happens in Iraq, even if it becomes Switzerland, we overpaid for it. And, for that, I have nothing but regrets. We overpaid in lives, in the wounded, in tarnished values, in dollars and in the lost focus on America’s development. Iraqis, of course, paid dearly as well.One reason the costs were so high is because the project was so difficult. Another was the incompetence of George W. Bush’s team in prosecuting the war. The other reason, though, was the nature of the enemy. Iran, the Arab dictators and, most of all, Al Qaeda did not want a democracy in the heart of the Arab world, and they tried everything they could — in Al Qaeda’s case, hundreds of suicide bombers financed by Arab oil money — to sow enough fear and sectarian discord to make this democracy project fail.So no matter the original reasons for the war, in the end, it came down to this: Were America and its Iraqi allies going to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies in the heart of the Arab world or were Al Qaeda and its allies going to defeat them? Thanks to the Sunni Awakening movement in Iraq, and the surge, America and its allies defeated them and laid the groundwork for the most important product of the Iraq war: the first ever voluntary social contract between Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites for how to share power and resources in an Arab country and to govern themselves in a democratic fashion. America helped to midwife that contract in Iraq, and now every other Arab democracy movement is trying to replicate it — without an American midwife. You see how hard it is.Which leads to the “maybe, sort of, we’ll see.” It is possible to overpay for something that is still transformational. Iraq had its strategic benefits: the removal of a genocidal dictator; the defeat of Al Qaeda there, which diminished its capacity to attack us; the intimidation of Libya, which prompted its dictator to surrender his nuclear program (and helped expose the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear network); the birth in Kurdistan of an island of civility and free markets and the birth in Iraq of a diverse free press. But Iraq will only be transformational if it truly becomes a model where Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, the secular and religious, Muslims and non-Muslims, can live together and share power.As you can see in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, this is the issue that will determine the fate of all the Arab awakenings. Can the Arab world develop pluralistic, consensual politics, with regular rotations in power, where people can live as citizens and not feel that their tribe, sect or party has to rule or die? This will not happen overnight in Iraq, but if it happens over time it would be transformational, because it is the necessary condition for democracy to take root in that region. Without it, the Arab world will be a dangerous boiling pot for a long, long time.The best-case scenario for Iraq is that it will be another Russia — an imperfect, corrupt, oil democracy that still holds together long enough so that the real agent of change — a new generation, which takes nine months and 21 years to develop — comes of age in a much more open, pluralistic society. The current Iraqi leaders are holdovers from the old era, just like Vladimir Putin in Russia. They will always be weighed down by the past. But as Putin is discovering — some 21 years after Russia’s democratic awakening began — that new generation thinks differently. I don’t know if Iraq will make it. The odds are really long, but creating this opportunity was an important endeavor, and I have nothing but respect for the Americans, Brits and Iraqis who paid the price to make it possible.
With the withdrawal of the last U.S. troops from Iraq, we’re finally going to get the answer to the core question about that country: Was Iraq the way Iraq was because Saddam was the way Saddam was, or was Saddam the way Saddam was because Iraq is the way Iraq is — a collection of sects and tribes unable to live together except under an iron fist. Now we’re going to get the answer because both the internal iron fist that held Iraq together (Saddam Hussein) and the external iron fist (the U.S. armed forces) have been removed. Now we will see whether Iraqis can govern themselves in a decent manner that will enable their society to progress — or end up with a new iron fist. You have to hope for the best because so much is riding on it, but the early signs are worrying.
Related
Times Topic: Iraq
Related in Opinion
More on the Middle East »
Readers’ Comments
Share your thoughts.
Iraq was always a war of choice. As I never bought the argument that Saddam had nukes that had to be taken out, the decision to go to war stemmed, for me, from a different choice: Could we collaborate with the people of Iraq to change the political trajectory of this pivotal state in the heart of the Arab world and help tilt it and the region onto a democratizing track? After 9/11, the idea of helping to change the context of Arab politics and address the root causes of Arab state dysfunction and Islamist terrorism — which were identified in the 2002 Arab Human Development Report as a deficit of freedom, a deficit of knowledge and a deficit of women’s empowerment — seemed to me to be a legitimate strategic choice. But was it a wise choice?
My answer is twofold: “No” and “Maybe, sort of, we’ll see.”
I say “no” because whatever happens in Iraq, even if it becomes Switzerland, we overpaid for it. And, for that, I have nothing but regrets. We overpaid in lives, in the wounded, in tarnished values, in dollars and in the lost focus on America’s development. Iraqis, of course, paid dearly as well.
One reason the costs were so high is because the project was so difficult. Another was the incompetence of George W. Bush’s team in prosecuting the war. The other reason, though, was the nature of the enemy. Iran, the Arab dictators and, most of all, Al Qaeda did not want a democracy in the heart of the Arab world, and they tried everything they could — in Al Qaeda’s case, hundreds of suicide bombers financed by Arab oil money — to sow enough fear and sectarian discord to make this democracy project fail.
So no matter the original reasons for the war, in the end, it came down to this: Were America and its Iraqi allies going to defeat Al Qaeda and its allies in the heart of the Arab world or were Al Qaeda and its allies going to defeat them? Thanks to the Sunni Awakening movement in Iraq, and the surge, America and its allies defeated them and laid the groundwork for the most important product of the Iraq war: the first ever voluntary social contract between Sunnis, Kurds and Shiites for how to share power and resources in an Arab country and to govern themselves in a democratic fashion. America helped to midwife that contract in Iraq, and now every other Arab democracy movement is trying to replicate it — without an American midwife. You see how hard it is.
Which leads to the “maybe, sort of, we’ll see.” It is possible to overpay for something that is still transformational. Iraq had its strategic benefits: the removal of a genocidal dictator; the defeat of Al Qaeda there, which diminished its capacity to attack us; the intimidation of Libya, which prompted its dictator to surrender his nuclear program (and helped expose the Abdul Qadeer Khan nuclear network); the birth in Kurdistan of an island of civility and free markets and the birth in Iraq of a diverse free press. But Iraq will only be transformational if it truly becomes a model where Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, the secular and religious, Muslims and non-Muslims, can live together and share power.
As you can see in Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, this is the issue that will determine the fate of all the Arab awakenings. Can the Arab world develop pluralistic, consensual politics, with regular rotations in power, where people can live as citizens and not feel that their tribe, sect or party has to rule or die? This will not happen overnight in Iraq, but if it happens over time it would be transformational, because it is the necessary condition for democracy to take root in that region. Without it, the Arab world will be a dangerous boiling pot for a long, long time.
The best-case scenario for Iraq is that it will be another Russia — an imperfect, corrupt, oil democracy that still holds together long enough so that the real agent of change — a new generation, which takes nine months and 21 years to develop — comes of age in a much more open, pluralistic society. The current Iraqi leaders are holdovers from the old era, just like Vladimir Putin in Russia. They will always be weighed down by the past. But as Putin is discovering — some 21 years after Russia’s democratic awakening began — that new generation thinks differently. I don’t know if Iraq will make it. The odds are really long, but creating this opportunity was an important endeavor, and I have nothing but respect for the Americans, Brits and Iraqis who paid the price to make it possible.
- Rob DL
- Connecticut
- Trusted
An honest and levelheaded assessment of the current plight of Iraq, free from the normal hysteria and emotional outbursts that we've come to expect whenever the subject is mentioned.
I never considered Tom Friedman necessarily to be a brave man, but after writing this piece in waters full of sharks ready to chomp if someone acknowledges Saddam was a "homicidal dictator", I suppose he deserves the designation.
It is certainly possible to have opposed the war and/or it's conduct while at the same time acknowledging the obvious: Saddam was a brutal megalomaniac who went as far as gassing a whole race of people, and Iraq is certainly better off without him. The fact that many of us can't mention this without being accused of warmongering, speaks to the irrationality the Iraq War instigates even when all we're trying to do is assess the odds of success moving forward.
Much of Iraq's chances of success rest on it's ability to put aside religious/sectarian differences for the sake of working together. Based on this criteria, I have little hope for a long-lasting solution for Iraq.
- beethy
- CA
- Trusted
We sure grossly "over paid" for our groundless involvement in Iraq. Even the promoters, known apologists for the war, agree (though grudgingly) how wrong we were.
Now that we are out, just think of what we left behind: Now, the highest ranking Sunni in that 'democratically' government has fled to Kurd part of the country in face of an arrest warrant against him for planning to kill people (which he denies).
We cannot be involved in 'nation building' unless people of that country desperately want it but cannot by themselves: We sure can help, while we have crying needs at home.
We cannot force-feed democracy on a country, unless people in that country want it, nurture it and protect it when they get it.
We have learned some hard lessons, but have we really learned anything, and would do better in the future???
- Tim B
- Seattle
- Trusted
You write about strategic decisions as if the U.S. were playing a game of chess. Any country as a sovereign nation is going to resent the invasion of its borders by any foreign power, especially one as drunk on power as we were prior to going into this war. A fiasco.
I knew there was something seriously wrong with decisions coming from the Bush administration when there were already murmurings about Iraq just days after 9-11 ... and Cheney early on said that Iraq had nothing to do with 9-11. I also recall Saddam desperately trying to appease the United States by attempting to comply with demands that one of its types of missiles, as I recall which had a range only slightly longer than that 'allowed', be destroyed. News accounts pre-invasion related that those missiles were being mechanically crushed.
There was no appeasing the hawks of the Bush administration, intent on going in and doing their 'shock and awe' presentation, and attempting to remake that country into one acceptable to the neo-cons philosophy. And allowing us unfettered access to their oil. Anyone who bought into that line of blarney about the necessity of that war was not paying attention at all to the events leading up to it. Your reasoning then was seriously flawed, and from what I read in today's column, it still is.
- Tom McMahon
- Millis Ma.
- Trusted
No that we have left the world will witness firsthand the hatred between Sunni and Shitte. Iraq is destined to fall into a power struggle between Islamic forces unfriendly to the U.S. and friends with Iran. Or a regional power of its own with internal strife going on for decades. We left it better than we found it, the only problem is no person ever asked the question. How many Iraqi's must die to free Iraq. The answer is over one million died. A high price to pay to jump from the frying pan to the fire. Naively George W Bush said God told him it was his place to free the Iraqi people. I think it was Dick Cheney playing God and Bush buying it.
- Winning Progressive
- Chicago, IL
- Trusted
Mr. Friedman, given that you were someone who loudly cheerleaded for what we progressive knew was the bad idea of invading Iraq, and later described the Iraq War as simply a way to tell the Middle East to "suck on this," I don't think you really have any credibility left to talk about the lessons of that misguided folly.
You ask and offer a few reasons why the cost of the war was so high in comparison to the results, but you overlook the key one - that invading another country is not a way to bring democracy to it. War is, unfortunately, necessary at times. For example, it can be an appropriate response for halting genocide, is necessary to stop the invasion of one country by another, and can provide critical limited support to a democracy movement that is under threat of being brutally crushed.
But using war as a way to promote democracy is sheer folly, as the difference in the results of President W. Bush and President Obama's foreign policy has shown. There is still a far way to go in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, but the progress made there through President Obama's patient approach of supporting the will of the people in those nation's and using force only when absolutely necessary has been far greater than the disaster that was caused by the neocon fantasies that led us into Iraq and are trying to get us into Iran.
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