Data is the core of crisis management
The fact that Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) took more than nine hours before retracting a false report that an astronomically high concentration of radiation had been detected in water in a turbine building at its quake- and tsunami-hit nuclear power plant has raised questions about its crisis management ability.
What is happening to the reactor can be assumed by analyzing the types of radioactive substances the water contains. The data is crucial in ascertaining what action should be taken and predicting what will happen to the plant in the future.
Initially, TEPCO and the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) announced figures showing that the water in the turbine building of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant's No. 2 reactor contained a high concentration of iodine-134.
If the data was accurate, it would point to the possibility that the reactor had reached criticality in which nuclear fission is self-sustaining. If that happened, it would be far more difficult to place the reactor under control, raising fears that a massive amount of radiation will spread.
The data was corrected 9 1/2 hours after it was released. Nevertheless, this has not dispelled the public's sense of crisis, as the mistake has highlighted problems involving the accuracy of data analysis, assessment of analysis results and the way information is communicated.
Inaccurate analysis of data could bring grave consequences. If serious problems involving the reactor worsened while TEPCO and the government regulator relied on wrong data, it could lead to an irreparable state of affairs. Such a situation must be avoided at all costs.
Obvious mistakes involving data can be corrected quickly if an evaluation system functions properly. Experts point out they could have easily found the data, which TEPCO and NISA had said suggested that the water contained iodine-134, was wrong if they had seen the figures. So one cannot help but wonder why TEPCO failed to promptly correct the data. Questions remains as to whether the power supplier has no system to accurately analyze data.
NISA's response has also raised questions about whether it assessed the data on its own. If it had failed to do so, that would mean that the organization has become dysfunctional.
If TEPCO and NISA had believed the data was correct, they should have pointed to the possibility that the reactor could reach criticality. If they had suspected that the data was incorrect, they should have promptly corrected the figures. The government's Nuclear Safety Agency of Japan (NSC) has also failed to sufficiently dispatch information on the crisis at the nuclear plant, which the public needs.
The way that TEPCO and the government regulator concerned analyze and evaluate data and release relevant information to the public -- which is the core of their crisis management -- needs to be improved promptly. In doing so, they should take care not to adversely affect the ongoing efforts to place the nuclear plant under control.
The fatigue and stress of the workers who are tackling problems with the plant have apparently reached the limit of their endurance. It can be easily imagined that their working environment is extremely poor, and that there is a shortage of personnel. Both TEPCO and the government regulator are required to identify these problems and provide psychological and material support to the workers. Otherwise, other mistakes could be made in efforts to place the plant under control.
Top priority should now be placed on efforts to cool down the reactors. TEPCO and the government regulator should go ahead with the work while identifying priorities and protecting workers from radiation. Now is the time for all those concerned to devote themselves to achieve this common goal.
(Mainichi Japan) March 29, 2011
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