Showing posts with label Nuclear crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nuclear crisis. Show all posts
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Wednesday, September 7, 2011
07/09 Kan: Nuclear crisis 'man-made' / Ex-PM says poor flow of info hindered N-plant accident response
Former Prime Minister Naoto Kan during an interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun
The ongoing crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant should be considered a "man-made disaster," and poor communication with the plant's operator hindered the initial government response, former Prime Minister Naoto Kan has told The Yomiuri Shimbun.
In an exclusive interview, Kan also said he felt "very sorry" for residents of Fukushima Prefecture who would not be able to return to their homes for a long time due to the nuclear crisis.
"There in fact were various opinions [regarding the safety of the plant] before the accident, but no well-thought-out preparations were made," he said. "In that sense, the nuclear accident should be considered a man-made disaster."
Referring to the response to the accident by the Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry's Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and the Cabinet Office's Nuclear Safety Commission, Kan said the two watchdogs had been "unable to foresee the possibility that all power sources could be lost" at the nuclear complex.
As a result, neither the agency nor the commission could deal effectively with the circumstances that arose after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami knocked out the plant's cooling systems, he said.
Kan said there also were problems with the flow of information from the plant's operator, Tokyo Electric Power Co.
The former prime minister said he ended up calling Masao Yoshida, the head of the plant, in a bid to gauge what was actually happening.
Kan revealed that the off-site emergency response center near the plant, though supposed to serve as a front-line command center in the event of a crisis, was vacated soon after the accident.
"As a result, arrangements that had been assumed in accident simulations hardly worked at all," said Kan, who stepped down late last month.
Kan was frustrated by the lack of details TEPCO provided soon after the disaster.
"Although I instructed the utility to vent [vapor in the nuclear reactor containers], TEPCO failed to do this, and I wasn't told of the reasons for that failure," he said. "Even as I sought an explanation for this situation, I couldn't tell whose decisions I was being given. It was like a game of Chinese whispers."
Kan visited Fukushima Prefecture on Aug. 27, the day after he officially announced he would resign as prime minister. He conveyed to the prefectural governor his view that people in some radiation-affected areas might be unable to return to their homes for a long period. He also called for the Fukushima government's approval to have temporary storage facilities for radiation-tainted materials built in the prefecture.
"I felt very sorry for all the victims of the disaster, but I thought it was my responsibility as prime minister in office at the time of the March 11 disaster to speak about the worst possible scenario," he said.
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Excerpts from Kan interview
Following are excerpts from former Prime Minister Naoto Kan's interview with The Yomiuri Shimbun on the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant accident, one of the biggest challenges he faced while in office.
Question: What do you think was the biggest factor behind the nuclear crisis?
Kan: All the crisis-management arrangements that had been made prior to the accident failed to function properly.
Q: Do you wish you had responded differently to the crisis?
Kan: Nobody can be 100 percent perfect, but I believe I did what I should have done.
Q: It seemed the government and TEPCO were often one step behind developments during the crisis.
Kan: That accident was beyond our expectations, so there were no preparations to cope with it properly. It had been assumed there was no possibility the plant's power sources would be lost, so it was only natural that we were one step behind as the crisis unfolded.
Q: When did you contact the head of the Fukushima No. 1 plant, Mr. Masao Yoshida?
Kan: Whenever I needed firsthand information about the conditions at the nuclear plant and what decisions were being made there. Mr. Yoshida gave me adequate answers, but it couldn't be helped that information I obtained from TEPCO's head office was incomplete and insufficient.
Q: Was the lack of accurate information the biggest problem?
Kan: Definitely. That I could not get correct information stemmed from shortcomings in the system.
Q: Was it your idea to have Self-Defense Forces helicopters drop water into pools for storing spent nuclear fuel at the plant reactors?
Kan: That was basically done at my request. The temperature of the spent nuclear fuel pool was rising alarmingly, and the United States was also expressing concern. The SDF operation drastically changed the mood of the people involved. Everybody suddenly became very positive about tackling the crisis.
(Sep. 7, 2011)
Monday, September 5, 2011
05/09 余録：ＳＰＥＥＤＩ問題 - Gov't must learn lessons from nuclear crisis response to avoid repeating mistakes
A radiation expert says what has infuriated him most since crisis broke out at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant is that the government initially withheld data from the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), which predicted how radioactive substances would spread. His anger is understandable.
Clouds of radioactive substances drifted northwest as well as toward the Kanto area around Tokyo between March 15 and 16, and between March 20 and 22. There are many people who fled to areas that the clouds were drifting towards, and those who allowed their children to play outdoors without knowing how radioactive substances were spreading. It is difficult to imagine how people saying, "If I had only known about the projections ..." are feeling now.
A government map displaying radiation levels in the area around the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant.
As if to add insult to injury, it has turned out that projections made on March 11 of nuclear reactor core meltdowns were ignored by the Prime Minister's Office. It is surprising that the government has disclosed this fact at this stage, but its claim that it "never thought of utilizing the data because it is not based on confirmed facts" is also astounding. Exactly because facts cannot be immediately confirmed, the government should have protected residents of affected areas by making predictions. SPEEDI, as well as a system to predict meltdowns, exists for that very purpose.
The government is now paying the price for ignoring the projections of the widespread diffusion of radioactive substances. Numerous beef cows were contaminated with radiation through tainted feed, and so-called hot spots -- sites where radiation levels are far higher than the surrounding area -- have been discovered one after another. The government's acknowledgement, six months after the nuclear crisis began, that residents of highly contaminated areas cannot return home for decades also appears to be an "after-effect" of ignoring the diffusion predictions.
An experiment to decontaminate soil is conducted in Kawamata, Fukushima Prefecture, on Aug. 11. (Mainichi)
University of Tokyo professor Tatsuhiko Kodama has urged that an expert committee comprised of "fresh" members be set up to protect children and expecting mothers from radiation, and promote the decontamination of affected areas in an appropriate manner. Kodama places emphasis on "fresh" members because he fears that experts who have been involved in the past mistakes will only make excuses. His opinion is convincing, considering the government's response to the nuclear crisis.
Unfortunately, all the Diet members were directly or indirectly involved in the mistakes. Therefore, all politicians should confront the mistakes made in the days and weeks after the meltdowns. The new administration of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda must pay close attention to the crisis to see if any mistake is being made, and eliminate the causes of any potential mistake. ("Yoroku," a front-page column in the Mainichi Shimbun)
Click here for the original Japanese story(Mainichi Japan) September 8, 2011
余録：ＳＰＥＥＤＩ問題
福島第１原発の事故発生以来、一番腹立たしかったことは何か。研究者と話して意見が一致した。事故当初、放射性物質の拡散を予測する「ＳＰＥＥＤＩ」のデータを政府が非公開としたことだ▲放射性物質の雲は３月１５～１６日や２０～２２日ごろに北西方向や関東地方などに流れた。拡散を知らず雲が向かった地域に避難したり、子どもを外で遊ばせた人もいる。「予測さえ知っていれば」。そう思わずにいられない当事者の気持ちはいかばかりか▲追い打ちをかけるように炉心溶融の予測が放置されていたこともわかった。今ごろの公表に驚くが、「事実に基づくデータではないので活用に思い至らなかった」との釈明にもがく然とする。「事実」がわからないからこそ「予測」によって住民を守る。溶融予測も拡散予測もそのためのシステムではなかったのか▲大量の放射性物質の拡散から目を背けたツケは大きい。稲わらによる牛肉の汚染、今も続く新たなホットスポットの発見。半年近くたって「何十年も帰れない」という見通しが飛び出すのも、その「後遺症」と感じる▲「子どもと妊婦を守り、的確な除染を進めるために、清新な有識者による委員会を」。東大の児玉龍彦教授が訴えている。「清新」と断るのは、これまでの「失敗」に関与した人々は言い訳に陥りやすいから。政府の対応を見ると、その指摘にうなずかざるをえない▲残念ながら今の国会にこれまでの失敗に無関係な人はいない。だからこそ、過去の失敗から目を背けずに向き合う。現在進行中の失敗がないか目を光らせ、先手を打つ。そんな真摯（しんし）さと胆力が新政権に問われている。
英訳
毎日新聞 2011年9月5日 0時01分
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