Showing posts with label Yemen. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Yemen. Show all posts

Friday, March 16, 2012

Swiss woman kidnapped in western Yemen


16 March 2012  

Map of Yemen
A Swiss woman has been kidnapped by armed men in Yemen, officials say.
The woman was seized on Wednesday in Hodeida on the west coast, where she works as a teacher, but is reportedly being held in Shabwa province.
The Swiss foreign ministry said it was in contact with Yemeni authorities to ensure the woman's release and safety.
Several officials blamed tribesmen, who they said were demanding the release of jailed relatives. But tribal elders and one official said it was al-Qaeda.
"The kidnapping bears the hallmark of al-Qaeda," a security official told the AFP news agency.

Thursday, January 19, 2012

Xu hướng toàn trị bị thách thức khắp nơi


Tunisia khai mào cho Mùa Xuân Ả Rập một năm trước
19 tháng 1, 2012
Mùa Xuân Ả Rập gây choáng váng cho các chế độ ở Trung Đông nhưng cũng tạo ra thách thức lớn nhất từ 20 năm qua cho các chính quyền độc đoán ở châu Á, theo đánh giá của cơ quan giám sát dân chủ Freedom House.
Nhưng cũng vì thế, trong phản ứng tự vệ, nhiều chế độ ra tay trấn áp các tiếng nói đối kháng, khiến xu hướng dân chủ có vẻ bị xuống thế.
Vào dịp kỷ niệm một năm các biến động bắt đầu tại Bắc Phi, bắt đầu từ Tunisia tháng 1/2011, báo cáo của Freedom House công bố hôm 19/01/2012 nói Trung Quốc đã tăng cường trấn áp các nhà bất đồng chính kiến trong cả nước.

Sunday, October 23, 2011

23/10 U.S. airstrike that killed American teen in Yemen raises legal, ethical questions



By , Published: October 23


One week after a U.S. military airstrike killed a 16-year-old American citizen in Yemen, no one in the Obama administration, Pentagon or Congress has taken responsibility for his death, or even publicly acknowledged that it happened.
The absence of official accountability for the demise of Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, a Denver native and the son of an al-Qaeda member, deepens the legal and ethical murkiness of the Obama administration’s campaign to kill alleged enemies of the state outside of traditional war zones.

Sunday, October 9, 2011

09/10 Tổng thống Yemen 'sẽ từ chức'


Chủ nhật, 9/10/2011, 09:54 GMT+7

Tổng thống Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh hôm qua tuyên bố ông sẽ từ bỏ quyền lực trong vài ngày tới.

Ông
Ông Ali Abdullah Saleh. Ảnh: EPA.
BBC cho biết, ông Saleh công bố ý định từ chức trong một bài phát biểu trên truyền hình hôm qua. “Tôi không thèm khát quyền lực. Tôi cự tuyệt quyền lực và tôi sẽ từ bỏ nó trong những ngày tới”, ông tuyên bố.

Friday, September 30, 2011

30/09 Trùm khủng bố Anwar al-Awlaki bị giết


Thứ Sáu, 30/09/2011 20:29

(NLĐO) - Theo bộ quốc phòng Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki, nhân vật quan trọng của al-Qaeda bị giết chết trong một đợt không kích tại Yemen.

Các quan chức Mỹ giấu tên đã xác nhận thông tin trên nhưng từ chối cung cấp chi tiết.

Theo thông báo của bộ quốc phòng Yemen thì Awlaki đã chết cùng đồng bọn. Nhưng một số nguồn tin cho AFP biết rằng Awlaki đã bị giết trong một cuộc không kích nhắm vào hai chiếc xe ở tỉnh Marib, một thành trì của al-Qaeda ở phía đông Yemen, vào sáng 30-9.
 
Anwar al-Awlaki, một trong những nhân vật chủ chốt của al-Qaeda
      
Một quan chức Mỹ giấu tên nói với hãng tin AP, Awlaki đã bị giết chết bởi máy bay không người lái của Mỹ. Tuy nhiên, thi thể của Awlaki hiện trong tay Yemen. Truyền hình Yemen thông báo rộng rãi cái chết của Awlaki.
 
Awlaki được mô tả như một nhà lãnh đạo chủ chốt của al-Qaeda ở bán đảo Ả Rập (AQAP). Trùm khủng bố này có rất nhiều biệt danh khác nhau như "Giáo chủ Hồi giáo E-mail", "Chuyên gia YouTube", "Osama Bin Laden mạng"... Awlaki bị tình báo Mỹ quy trách nhiệm tổ chức vụ xả súng giết chết 13 người tại căn cứ quân đội ở Fort Hood, Texas, vào năm ngoái và âm mưu đánh bom một chiếc máy bay hướng đến Detroit vào ngày 25-9-2009. Nước Mỹ xem Awlaki là nhân vật “đáng ngại nhất” đe dọa an ninh Mỹ.
                             
Trước đây, Bộ Quốc phòng Yemen từng một lần thông báo tiêu diệt được Awlaki nhưng sau đó thừa nhận vẫn còn sống.
Minh Khuê (Theo BBC)

Sunday, September 25, 2011

BBC - World Tonight



All posts on "The Editors" in the category: World Tonight

Saturday, May 14, 2011

03/05 Trung tâm chỉ huy al-Qaeda chuyển sang Yemen?

03/05/2011 | 10:32:00

Chỉ huy mới của al-Qaeda sắp tới có thể là Anwar al-Awlaqi. (Nguồn: Internet)
CÁC TIN LIÊN QUAN
“Taliban sẽ đánh bom tiếp trả thù cho bin Laden”
Taliban tuyên bố sẽ tiếp tục tổ chức những vụ đánh bom mới nhắm vào Mỹ và Pakistan để trả thù cho cái chết của Osama bin Laden.

3 mục tiêu ưu tiên của nhóm al-Qaeda ở châu Phi
Theo tài liệu mà Mỹ thu được tại nhà bin Laden, Algeria, Somalia và Yemen có thể trở thành mục tiêu ưu tiên của al-Qaeda ở châu Phi.

Báo Dân tộc của Các tiểu vương quốc Arập thống nhất (UAE) ngày 3/5 dẫn nhận định của các nhà phân tích cho rằng cái chết của trùm khủng bố Osama bin Laden có thể chuyển cương vị chỉ huy tổ chức khủng bố al-Qaeda tới Yemen, quê hương của Bin Laden.

Theo đó, Yemen có thể trở thành trung tâm của al-Qaeda với việc các chiến binh lợi dụng cơ hội tình hình bất ổn và mạng lưới an ninh bị phân tán tại quốc gia này. Các chuyên gia dự báo nhánh al-Qaeda đặt tại Yemen, tổ chức đã hai lần âm mưu tấn công nhằm vào Mỹ năm 2009, sẽ gia tăng mạnh hoạt động.

Theo người phát ngôn Nhà Trắng, al-Qaeda trên bán đảo Arập hiện được xem là mối đe dọa khủng bố lớn nhất đối với an ninh quốc tế và nằm dưới sự chỉ huy của giáo sỹ thánh chiến người Mỹ gốc Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaqi.

Các chuyên gia khủng bố tin rằng vùng đồi núi của Yemen có thể là Tora Bora tiếp theo - nơi ẩn náu trước đây của Bin Laden tại Afghanistan.

Awlaqi được các chuyên gia xem như nguyên mẫu cho một thế hệ chỉ huy mới của al-Qaeda. Nhân vật này muốn sử dụng Yemen làm thành trì của tổ chức khủng bố này.

Nabil Bukairi, Giám đốc Trung tâm nghiên cứu Abaad ở Yemen, nhận định: "Trung tâm khủng bố tiếp theo dự kiến sẽ là Yemen. Awlaqi đã trở thành bộ mặt của tổ chức này trong nhiều cuốn băng ghi hình. Đây là bước ngoặt cho cuộc chiến chống khủng bố."/.

(Vietnam+)

Monday, March 28, 2011

27/03 Hoping for Arab Mandelas By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

March 26, 2011
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN

With Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria now all embroiled in rebellions, it is not an exaggeration to suggest that the authoritarian lid that has smothered freedom in the Arab world for centuries may be coming off all 350 million Arab peoples at once. Personally, I think that is exactly what is going to happen over time. Warm up the bus for all the Arab autocrats — and for you, too, Ahmadinejad. As one who has long believed in the democracy potential for this part of the world, color me both really hopeful and really worried about the prospects.

I am hopeful because the Arab peoples are struggling for more representative and honest government, which is what they will need to overcome their huge deficits in education, freedom and women’s empowerment that have been holding them back. But getting from here to there requires crossing a minefield of tribal, sectarian and governance issues.

The best way to understand the potential and pitfalls of this transition is to think about Iraq. I know that the Iraq war and the democracy-building effort that followed have been so bitterly divisive in America that no one wants to talk about Iraq. Well, today we’re going to talk about Iraq because that experience offers some hugely important lessons for how to manage the transition to democratic governance of a multisectarian Arab state when the iron lid is removed.

Democracy requires 3 things: citizens — that is, people who see themselves as part of an undifferentiated national community where anyone can be ruler or ruled. It requires self-determination — that is, voting. And it requires what Michael Mandelbaum, author of “Democracy’s Good Name,” calls “liberty.”

“While voting determines who governs,” he explained, “liberty determines what governments can and cannot do. Liberty encompasses all the rules and limits that govern politics, justice, economics and religion.”

And building liberty is really hard. It will be hard enough in Middle East states with big, homogenous majorities, like Egypt, Tunisia and Iran, where there is already a powerful sense of citizenship and where national unity is more or less assumed. It will be doubly hard in all the other states, which are divided by tribal, ethnic and sectarian identities and where the threat of civil war is ever present.

Not one was more divided in that way than Iraq. What did we learn there? First, we learned that when you removed the authoritarian lid the tensions between Iraqi Kurds, Shiites and Sunnis erupted as each faction tested the other’s power in a low-grade civil war. But we also learned that alongside that war many Iraqis expressed an equally powerful yearning to live together as citizens. For all of the murderous efforts by Al Qaeda to trigger a full-scale civil war in Iraq, it never happened. And in Iraq’s last election, the candidate who won the most seats, a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, ran on a multisectarian platform with Sunnis. Lesson: While these tribal identities are deeply embedded and can blow up at anytime, there are also powerful countertrends in today’s more urbanized, connected, Facebooked Middle East.

“There is a problem of citizenship in the Arab world,” said Michael Young, the Lebanese author of “The Ghosts of Martyr’s Square,” “but that is partly because these regimes never allowed their people to be citizens. But despite that, you can see how much the demonstrators in Syria have been trying to stay nonviolent and speak about freedom for the whole nation.”

Lesson two: What was crucial in keeping the low-grade civil war in Iraq from exploding, what was crucial in their writing of their own Constitution for how to live together, and what was crucial in helping Iraqis manage multiple fair elections was that they had a credible neutral arbiter throughout this transition: the U.S.

America played that role at a staggering cost, and not always perfectly, but played it we did. In Egypt, the Egyptian Army is playing that arbiter role. Somebody has to play it in all these countries in revolt, so they can successfully lay the foundations of both democracy and liberty. Who will play that role in Libya? In Syria? In Yemen?

The final thing Iraq teaches us is that while external arbiters may be necessary, they are not sufficient. We’re leaving Iraq at the end of the year. Only Iraqis can sustain their democracy after we depart. The same will be true for all the other Arab peoples hoping to make this transition to self-rule. They need to grow their own arbiters — their own Arab Nelson Mandelas. That is, Shiite, Sunni and tribal leaders who stand up and say to each other what Mandela’s character said about South African whites in the movie “Invictus”: “We have to surprise them with restraint and generosity.”

This is what the new leaders of these Arab rebellions will have to do — surprise themselves and each other with a sustained will for unity, mutual respect and democracy. The more Arab Mandelas who emerge, the more they will be able to manage their own transitions, without army generals or outsiders. Will they emerge? Let’s watch and hope. We have no other choice. The lids are coming off.

Sunday, March 27, 2011

26/03 Every Revolution Is Revolutionary in Its Own Way

March 26, 2011

By SIMON SEBAG MONTEFIORE


London

A REVOLUTION resembles the death of a fading star, an exhilarating Technicolor explosion that gives way not to an ordered new galaxy but to a nebula, a formless cloud of shifting energy. And though every revolution is different, because all revolutions are local, in this uncertain age of Arab uprisings and Western interventions, as American missiles bombard a defiant Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya, as the ruler of Yemen totters on the brink and Syrian troops fire on protesters, the history of revolution can still offer us some clues to the future.

The German sociologist Max Weber cited three reasons for citizens to obey their rulers: “the authority of the eternal yesterday,” or historical prestige; “the authority of the extraordinary personal gift of grace,” or the ruler’s charisma; and “domination by virtue of legality,” or order and justice. The “authority of the eternal yesterday” is especially important because in the Arab world even republics tend to be dynastic.

Before his ouster, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt was grooming hereditary heirs. Before his death in 2000, Hafez al-Assad, the long-reigning Syrian dictator, handed over power to his son Bashar. Colonel Qaddafi has long ruled through a phalanx of thuggish dauphins, each playing a different role — one the totalitarian enforcer, another, the pro-Western liberalizer — and each vying for the succession. Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh similarly is safeguarded by special forces commanded by sons and nephews.

Yet “the life span of a dynasty corresponds to the life span of an individual,” wrote Ibn Khaldun, the brilliant 14th-century Islamic historian-statesman. All these Arab “monarchies” have rested on the prestige of a religion (Saudi Wahhabism or Iranian Twelver Shiism), a personality (in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the revolution; in Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, the memory of the most popular Arab ruler since Saladin, President Gamal Abdel Nasser; in Saudi Arabia, the founder-king Ibn Saud) or a heredity link (Jordan’s King Abdullah II’s descent from Muhammad). But “prestige ... decays inevitably,” ruled Ibn Khaldun.

Revolutions are set off by dramatic events, yes — a stolen election in Iran in 2009, a self-immolation in Tunisia. But they also reflect longstanding economic depression, not to mention rising expectations and the temptations of comparison: the Internet meant Arab youth could now compare their own stunted rights with those of their Western counterparts. The generational difference between their wizened pharaohs and the Twitter-obsessed youth worsened the crisis, which may yet mark the end of the ancient paradigm of the Arab ruler, the wise strong sheik, el Rais, the Boss. A dictator who is regularly mocked by the young for his Goth-black dyed hair and surgically enhanced cheekbones, and whose entourage features as many nurses as generals, is in trouble — he has lost “the personal gift of grace.”

Such dictators are often so sclerotic that they do not even realize there is a revolution until it is upon them. In 1848, Prince Metternich, the Austrian chancellor, was so old that he literally could not hear the mobs outside his own palace. When the riots started, I imagine Colonel Qaddafi or King Hamad al-Khalifa of Bahrain had a conversation something like this one:

“So what is it? A riot?” asked King Louis XVI in Paris in 1789.

“No, Sire,” replied his confidant La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, “it is a revolution.”

Leaderless revolutions without organization have a magically spontaneous momentum that is harder to crush. Lenin had just reflected that the revolution would never happen in his lifetime when in February 1917, hungry crowds in Petrograd overthrew Nicholas II while the revolutionaries were abroad, exiled or infiltrated by the secret police.

This time, headless spontaneity has been aided by Facebook, which certainly accelerates the mobilization of crowds — and the transmission of Western culture, whether it concerns Charlie Sheen’s soliloquies or the joys of American democracy. But technology’s effect is exaggerated: in 1848, the revolution that most resembles today’s, uprisings spread from Sicily to Paris, Berlin, Vienna and Budapest in mere weeks without telephones, let alone Twitter. They spread through the exuberance of momentum and the rigid isolation of repressive rulers.

Once the crowds are in the streets, the ability to crush revolutions depends on the ruler’s willingness and ability to shed blood. The more moderate the regimes, like the Shah’s Iran in 1979 or Hosni Mubarak’s Egypt, the easier to overthrow. The more brutal the police state, like Colonel Qaddafi’s Libya, President Saleh’s Yemen or President Assad’s Syria, the tougher to bring down. Iran has brutally repressed its opposition — it helps to not be an American ally and to exclude the international news media, as it’s much easier to massacre your people without being restrained by the State Department or CNN.

“Very pleasing commencements,” wrote Edmund Burke, observer of the French Revolution’s spiral from freedom to terror, “have often shameful, lamentable conclusions.” Look at Lebanon’s Cedar Revolution against Syria and its ally Hezbollah, which has ended with a Syrian-backed, Hezbollah-dominated government. The first success of revolution creates the exuberant dizziness of democratic freedom that we saw in Cairo and Benghazi. In Europe in 1848, in Russia in 1917, there were similarly exhilarating springs.

Often temporary leaders arise — think of Aleksandr Kerensky, the strutting Russian prime minister for some months before the Bolsheviks seized power — but every revolution has its figures who provide fig leafs for the hard men. Khomeini appointed Mehdi Bazargan, a democrat, as his prime minister, who ended up resigning during the hostage crisis.

The fiesta does not last long. The disorder, uncertainty and strife of a revolution make citizens yearn for stable authority, or they turn to radicalism. Certainly, extremists welcome this deterioration, as Lenin, that laconic dean of the university of revolutionology, expressed it with the slogan: “The worse, the better.” (At that point, extreme solutions become more palatable: “How can one make a revolution without firing squads?” asked Lenin.)

At this stage, leadership becomes vital: Lenin personally drove the Bolshevik coup in October 1917. Khomeini was decisive in creating a Shiite theocracy in Iran in 1979 just as Nelson Mandela ensured a peaceful transition in South Africa. But there are no clear opposition leaders in Libya, Yemen or Syria: a ruthless security apparatus has long since decimated any such candidates.

In 1848, the democratic spring did not last long before outside intervention: Czar Nicholas I of Russia crushed the revolutions in the Habsburg Empire, earning him the soubriquet “the gendarme of Europe.” The Saudi intervention against Shiite rebels in Bahrain suggests the Saudis are the gendarmes of the Gulf; in Yemen, President Saleh has also begged for Saudi help, which they have so far withheld. In Libya, of course, the reverse has happened: the West is backing the rebels against Colonel Qaddafi’s onslaught. Each case is different; all revolutions are local.

Whatever happens next in the Arab world, it will not simply be a reversion to Mubarak-ish military pharaohism. After the upheavals of 1848, strange political hybrids, modern yet authoritarian, emerged from the uncertainty: first Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte, the so-called prince-president and later emperor, in France; and, later, in the 1860s, Otto von Bismarck in Prussia. In complex Egypt, the result of the Arab revolutions is likely to be a similar hybrid, a new democracy, with the military in a special role of Turkish-style guardianship; in repressed Libya, it may simply be a return to tribal rivalry.

Libya, strafed by British and American planes, may be in the headlines but it is a minor country: it is the destinies of the key three — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran — that will decide everything. After all, Prince Metternich, the conservative Austrian who dominated Europe between the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the revolutions of 1848, said, “When Paris sneezes, Europe catches cold.”

Lesser countries, however, can hold the key to major ones: Syria is the old Arab heartland. The uprising in Syria could encourage resurgent revolution in its patron, Iran, which faces the challenge of exploiting the uprisings that undermine American allies without succumbing to its own unrest. Change in Syria could also liberate Lebanon from Hezbollah; the fall of the Bahraini king could infect the Saudi monarchy — just as Nasser’s overthrow of King Farouk in 1952 in Egypt led to the liquidation of the Iraqi monarchy a few years later. And we should always remember that however liberal these Facebooking revolutions may be, the rivalries between Shiite and Sunni are far more potent than Twitter and democracy.

What’s next? When Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Communist prime minister, analyzed the French Revolution two centuries later, he declared that “it’s too early to tell.” We should remember that while enthusiasts have repeatedly cited the revolutions of 1989 to 1991 as the encouraging precedent for today’s revolutions, how successful were those? Democracy flowered in Eastern Europe as well as Georgia and the Baltic countries, but most former Soviet republics are dictatorships like Uzbekistan or Belarus, or authoritarian like Putinist Russia.

No single American doctrine can or should fit this newly kaleidoscopic, multifaceted universe that is the Middle East from Iran to Morocco. We must realize this will be a long game, the grand tournament of the 21st century. We should protect innocent lives when we can — with limited airpower, not boots on the ground. We must analyze which countries matter to us strategically, and after the Facebook party dies down and the students exit the streets, figure out who is really controlling events in the places important to us.

The wisest judgments belong to statesmen who knew much about crushing and making revolutions. “Old Europe is at the beginning of the end,” reflected the ultraconservative Metternich as he was beset by revolutions, “but New Europe however has not yet even begun its existence, and between the End and the Beginning, there will be Chaos.” Lenin understood that the ultimate question in each revolution is always the unfathomable alchemy of power: who controls whom. Or as he put it so succinctly: “Who whom?”



Simon Sebag Montefiore is the author of the forthcoming “Jerusalem: The Biography.”













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