2011/04/10
Wallace Gregson (Photo by Yuko Lanham)WASHINGTON--A stronger Japan-U.S. alliance should emerge from the disaster wrought by the Great East Japan Earthquake, Wallace Gregson, former U.S. assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said.
"We want to help to make sure that this calamity, as bad as it is, leads to a stronger Japan and a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship," Gregson told The Asahi Shimbun.
In the first exclusive interview since his recent retirement, Gregson said, "The response thus far has been pretty impressive, on the Japanese side as well as the American side, and working in combination."
Looking back on his two-year service at the Pentagon's top job to oversee the alliance with Japan, the retired U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant general did not show any signs of frustration over the stalled relocation process of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in Okinawa Prefecture.
Asked if the eight-month policy review on the Futenma relocation by the Yukio Hatoyama Cabinet was a waste of time, Gregson responded, "It was one more validation of the work that was done earlier."
Gregson did not show any support for the idea of freezing the Futenma relocation process, either. Some Japan experts in the United States have recently started to push this idea out of consideration for Japan's political and economic difficulties after the March 11 earthquake and tsunami in northeastern Japan.
"I'm not sure how one freezes a strategic situation or freezes a political situation," Gregson said. "I think both of our governments have a number of historical examples where refusal to address an issue or refusal to address a problem only made the problem worse."
The interview in its entirety follows;
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Question: Can you first tell me how the decision to deploy U.S. forces for this humanitarian assistance and disaster relief(HA/DR) effort was made on the part of the U.S. government, especially the Department of Defense?
Answer: The important thing to understand about the decision-making is that there was no hesitation on the decision to provide aid. As everybody well understands now, this is a tremendously complex disaster and, as in most problems like this, the initial task was finding out exactly what happened and how bad the damage was. It's harder than it looks, or harder than it sounds.
When something destroys all the infrastructure, the ability to get reports goes away. We were fortunate that the USS Ronald Reagan (aircraft) battle group was in the area, on its way to other missions. The USS Essex amphibious ready group and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit were, ironically, in Malaysia for a disaster response exercise. So, they were immediately packed up and sent toward Japan.
I think the commanders did a great job in moving forces toward Japan, based on incomplete information, on the assumption that this was going to be really bad. And we were able to get forces there and do some early relief operations. We remain committed to do whatever is necessary to help get through the hardest parts of this response.
Q: Was it your decision or the combatant commander's?
A: It was combatant commander, Adm. Robert Willard (commander, U.S. Pacific Command). Of course, all of us on the staff were working the issues. But there was no hesitation. I heard nobody arguing that we needed to restrain our response or wait for data or wait for a request or anything like that. The goal was very much to move things forward, so that as Japan developed a better understanding of exactly what happened and what was needed, then we would have that capability much closer to hand than if we were waiting for complete understanding of the issue.
Q: How did you decide on the scale of deployment? Was there a scenario or a plan?
A: The usual process is that something called "humanitarian assistance survey teams" go in there early on and start to develop the situation.
We also deployed reconnaissance assets to take photos to try and get a better understanding of the extent of the damage. It's really hard to measure the disaster's effect in these early days, when all the infrastructure goes away, when the cellphone towers are down, when the phones are down, when people are trapped and can't communicate.
The information gap is really tremendous. Things were happening simultaneously. The forces were moving to the area, based on a judgment of what capabilities would be needed.
At the same time, we were working with our Japanese friends to get an assessment of the situation and start finding out more details. So, it was very much many processes moving forward at the same time, and there was very much a bias toward action. If we thought something might be needed, the decision--and it still continues to this day--the decision is: "Let's see if we can get it there. If it's not quite the right thing, that's OK, we can make use of it. If it is the right thing, then we have it there earlier."
What military forces bring, whether Self-Defense Forces or U.S. forces, is a cohesive organization, command and control, and logistics. Humanitarian assistance is not the first mission of the armed forces, but with the embedded capabilities we have, there's a lot of immediate response capabilities that can be provided, that become useful, especially very early on, in a response like this.
Over time, both Japanese forces and U.S. forces have practiced and learned to work and collaborate with the nongovernmental organizations, the professional aid providers, so that as they feed in, as they stand up their capabilities, we get a little more granular control over things instead of the relatively massive military response.
Q: This time the response was very quick and the deployment was enormously extensive. Was it because Japan is an ally of the United States?
A: Certainly that was part of it. Certainly the fact that America has very high regard for the Japanese was part of it. Certainly the fact that we have forces present in Japan was part of it. It was very much helping "a friend in need.''
Q: I heard that even though this is an HA/DR operation, the mobilization process is very similar to the one for an actual war situation.
A: You have to be careful of taking analogies too far, of course, but certainly the scale of damage that Japan suffered creates a situation very similar to a wartime situation. The challenges of getting control of the situation quickly have some parallels. The ability to make decisions with incomplete information, in a very stressful atmosphere, is also somewhat akin to a stressful traditional operational situation.
This is going to be a longer story than just the initial response, obviously, because the different aspects of this calamity make it very complex. I think the response thus far has been pretty impressive, on the Japanese side as well as the American side, and working in combination.
Q: In addition to the pure humanitarian motivation to rescue Japan and help the country recover, was there any strategic calculation behind the U.S. deployment, such as maintaining the strategic balance in this region?
A: The strategic situation in Asia remains pretty much the same as before the tsunami. The primary impetus behind the effort was based on the fact that the United States and Japan have been together for a long time now. We are partners. We are allies. Beyond that, we are friends.
There are many Americans in Japan. There are many Japanese in America. We want to help Japan to get back on its feet as quickly as possible. We want to help to make sure that this calamity, as bad as it is, leads to a stronger Japan and a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship.
Q: How do you assess the HA/DR operations by U.S. forces so far?
A: Well, it's early yet. As with any complex operation, at some point in the future there will be extensive lessons learned, and that will make us better for the next time. But I'd like to comment that, going back to the time when I was still on active duty and when I was stationed in Japan, we were working very closely with the Self-Defense Forces on discussions about HA/DR and various things.
The 2004 tsunami in Indonesia was a case in point, and I've been happy to observe the Self-Defense Forces being more and more involved in planning for responding to these types of operations. It doesn't surprise me that Japan has over 106,000 troops in the field aiding this response effort.
I haven't seen all the reports, but the things I have seen about combined convoys and search efforts to get into these very badly damaged areas, find people where they've tended to collect, show a common U.S.-Japanese effort. It is winter in this area. Providing shelter, providing heat, providing water, providing food, providing sanitation capabilities, getting in there to make sure that disease doesn't start, all of these efforts have been extraordinary. I think we've found every Japanese-speaking American officer that was in Japan and plugged them in with the Japanese command elements so that we could communicate better.
Q: How do you assess the response by the government of Japan (GOJ), especially the Self-Defense Forces?
A: I think the GOJ's response has been commendable. I think the Self-Defense Forces' response has been commendable. I have to add that there are many people outside of the operation that say, "Well, this was wrong, that was wrong," this type of thing. Until you've been in one of these operations, you really don't understand how difficult it is to find accurate data. You get a fragmentary report from here, a fragmentary report from there. You've got a number of people providing input.
The people, both on the government side, the Ministry of Defense side, and in the Self-Defense Forces side--and the U.S. side--are making decisions quickly, because you have to, based on the best information you have at the moment, information at best incomplete. If you do the wrong thing--if you do something and it turns out the situation's not quite the way you thought it was--you adjust and move on to the next one.
Q: Sort of "the fog of war."
A: Yes! It is very much "the fog of war." In the coolness of a conference room somebody can comment and say, "Well, this should have been done better." Yes, but the key to this, in my mind, has always been, "Do the best you can, quickly. Do something. Don't wait for perfect information. Do something, because you'll save more people if you act quickly than if you sit back and wait for a detailed analysis and make a very deliberate decision." By the time you have perfect information events have passed beyond you.
Q: I believe U.S. forces were well prepared for tsunami and earthquake., But what about those nuclear accidents? Were U.S. forces prepared for this kind of nuclear accident?
A: When you say we were prepared for an earthquake or a tsunami, yes, that's been studied, of course. But, the size of this, the very short time between the earthquake and the tsunami, where many people didn't have a chance to escape, the sheer scale of the devastation, the sheer size of the wave created great damage. I've seen anecdotal reports from our officers. They report that the scale of the devastation is like nothing they've ever seen.
The complex nature of this challenge, with the wide area of devastation from the tsunami and the smaller area, if you will, with a very specialized problem, with Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant, introduces a much larger level of difficulty. We do have nuclear-trained people in the U.S. military. We have far more in civilian government positions as well as in regular civilian pursuits. I am not one of these experts.
Q: That's intended for dealing with nuclear attacks, isn't it?
A: Not completely. There are plans on the civilian side to respond to similar challenges.
Q: Aren't the U.S. forces trained to operate under nuclear attacks?
A: Trained, to some extent, to be able to operate in that environment. There are people trained to do that. But, as with the problem I spoke about before, it's very, very difficult, for a lot of reasons, to be able to get accurate early assessments.
I think what's been going on since March 11th is that more and more control has been exerted over the situation, we're getting more and more of a handle on it. People get very disappointed when it seems like we're making progress and then we detect another problem.
That's kind of the nature of these things. There is no magic solution and progress is often slow. I have a lot of admiration for the scientists and the engineers that understand this business and how they're working with our Japanese friends to be able to make the best judgments possible, based on what we know at any given time, and do the best we can to take care of the health and safety of the very courageous individuals that are working most closely with the nuclear plant.
Q: I understand the U.S. government and the U.S. forces have their own set of rules and standards to protect against radiation. Can you tell me what they are?
A: I am not the expert on these kinds of procedures. You'd have to ask somebody else if they're standard. I would just offer a general comment that, with our private citizens that are in Japan, we're trying to err on the side of caution. We shouldn't make too much of some differences. It's a fact that we are dealing with a very complex situation, where the first challenge is to keep trying to determine exactly what is going on.
Q: I have heard that there were some cases where the coordination between Japan and the United States did not go quite well and the both parties ended up frustrated. One of the cases was the establishment of a no-fly zone by the United States, a 50-mile radius from the Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. Do you know why this kind of miscommunication happened?
A: In any situation like this, with multiple functions going on at the same time, I'd be surprised if there was no frustration.
I look at my Japanese friends working here, in Washington, at the Japanese Embassy. They are up all night because it's daytime in Tokyo. They are taking questions, taking information from Japan, which is awake. Then during our daytime, they're required to be awake also, because America is pushing questions at the embassy and looking for answers.
So, you have a lot of people working very hard, especially during the early stages of the operation, on very little sleep. You're going to get frustration. That's natural.
The very professional response from people has been, "Yes, we have frustrations. Yes, occasionally the word gets garbled or wrong data is passed." But the professional response is you just keep working through it and keep coordinating everything with everybody, and eventually you get clarity in the situation. If there were systemic problems, I think they've been worked out, and I'm quite sure other challenges will be worked out.
The normal day-to-day business of any government, in the normal day-to-day organization of any government, does not fit well with such a massive occurrence such as this. And this, I might add, happened without warning. Despite the best efforts of our scientists, nobody has accurately predicted earthquakes yet.
When you look at other natural disasters, many of which were predicted, you still see the same phenomena. I don't think we should make too much of the fact that there have been differences and there have been frustrations expressed on each side. As I said, we would be less than human if there weren't frustrations and some differences on this.
The key is what you do with it. I think what's happened is everybody is working through this instead of just throwing their hands up and not working anymore.
Q: Are there any other lessons learned?
A: I'll give you a couple of things that are very positive up front. All the work we've done on bilateral exercises, bilateral training, both on the civilian officials' side and on the uniformed officials' side, has worked. The American officials over there are well familiar with their counterparts. They have talked to them, they've sipped tea with them, and they understand their concerns and strengths.
I think that's served us well. When disaster happens, that's not the time to be introduced to your counterpart; it's time for people to show up like they did, from the American side, move into the Japanese command post, and say, "OK, what do you want me to do?" and we start working through it.
The rest of the lessons, I think, will emerge in time. I can't recall a more complex disaster response or a more complex, compounded, disaster, than what we have here.
The earthquake created the tsunami, the tsunami caused the wide devastation. The loss of power to the cooling pumps in the nuclear plant helped create the additional challenges. I don't know of any more complex challenge. I'm sure there'll be a rich menu of lessons that comes out of this, and we'll all be the stronger for it. I'm sure the nuclear industry will be stronger for it.
Q: How do you think the alliance will come out of this crisis?
A: It is my hope that not only the alliance comes out stronger--and I think that will happen--but I think that we need to make sure that, as bad as this calamity is, as bad as this disaster is, that this becomes a rallying point, a cause, that will bring both of our nations together in many other areas beyond the security area, to rebuild the Tohoku-Sendai area, to re-energize the nuclear industry, to re-energize the entire power industry.
I think that the combination of American capabilities, Japanese capabilities, the potential investment that can occur as we rebuild this area, will honor the people that we lost in this disaster.
Q: Next, the base realignment issue in Okinawa Prefecture. The casualty of this earthquake and tsunami in the alliance management could be the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) issue. I hear in the United States that the FRF is dead because Japan will not have enough funding to follow through on the bilateral agreement. What is your view?
A: I think that it would be much better to let Japan provide an assessment of its capabilities and intentions.
The tsunami has not changed the strategic situation in Asia and in the areas surrounding Japan. The tsunami has not changed certain political conditions in Japan.
Q: What do you mean by "certain political situations"? Are you talking about the situation on Okinawa?
A: Political conditions have not changed. The alliance transformation and realignment agreement as well as the following agreements are designed to ensure an enduring presence for the life of the alliance. That remains the goal.
Q: But some policy experts in the United States and even some government officials admit that the FRF is dead.
A: I don't agree. Many predictions have not proven true in this area.
Q: Given the enormous damage that this natural disaster inflicted on Japan and also the kind of confusion that the Japanese government is in, some people suggest the FRF plan should be frozen and put into a kind of "hibernation" until the Japanese government gets back to normal business. What do you think of this suggestion?
A: I'm not sure how one freezes a strategic situation or freezes a political situation. I think both of our governments have a number of historical examples where refusal to address an issue or refusal to address a problem only made the problem worse.
One of the keys to recovering in the tsunami-damaged area is going to be investment. One of the keys to resolving challenges regarding U.S. forces' presence, particularly in Okinawa, is development. And development, in turn, requires the land returns in Okinawa.
We should not hesitate to move forward on the rebuilding of the damaged area, in the area where the tsunami struck, but we should also move forward on other developments. A lot of the development plans for Okinawa take advantage of the economic potential there. Japan needs full participation from across the nation on the economic side and on the investment side now.
Freezing one part of the situation while you work on the others, I think, will make all problems, all challenges, more difficult.
Q: Looking back at the entire bilateral process of the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) and the base realignment, in which you have been deeply involved, what do you think went wrong? If you could do it all over again, how would you do it differently?
A: I think it's important to remember that the DPRI included a number of actions, most of which have been accomplished, most of which are contributing every day to the security of Japan and peace and stability in Asia.
We've co-located Air and Missile Defense Commands at Yokota Air Force Base. We have co-located the Central Readiness Force with the U.S. Army forward command element at Camp Zama. We have installed an X-band radar, thank you to Japan, to help with missile defense. We have the replacement runway completed at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, and preparations are being made to move Carrier Air Wing Five there, enhancing readiness and reducing the noise factor in the area surrounding Atsugi base, and also free up Atsugi to do other things. We've accomplished a number of things under the DPRI.
The piece that remains is the famous piece: the relocation of the Futenma Marine Corps Air Station and the subsequent realignment of U.S., and I would submit, Japanese forces, to Guam. Perhaps we allowed a lot of mischaracterizations to take place. It is not the Marines leaving Okinawa. There are still going to be about 10,000 Marines on Okinawa. It’s more appropriately thought of as a realignment of the alliance to Guam. Not only will American forces be on Guam. We will build up capabilities on Guam, and we intend to greatly enhance our ability to train with Japanese forces, through the development of training capabilities in Guam and in surrounding areas.
Our agreements call for the continuous presence of Japanese aviation, ground and, by implication, naval, forces and their training, in Guam. It's a counterpart. We have Americans stationed on Japanese soil, in Japan. Now we're going to have a lot of Japanese forces present on American territory, on a continuous basis.
I think this is good. I think it allows us to do far more bilateral training and develop our capabilities when we're operating together to a much higher level than we are now. Increased military capabilities in the alliance also support an increased political closeness, a stronger political alignment, and a stronger people-to-people alignment.
I see this as positive. We've allowed our focus on the near-term matters that need attention, the "bugs on the windshield," if you will, to cloud our vision of where we're trying to go on this journey.
Q: In retrospect, what do you think of the eight-month review process of the FRF relocation agreement under the Hatoyama administration? Was it a waste of time?
A: It slowed down the forward movement we were experiencing but, on the other hand, it was not a waste of time. After we raked through all the aspects of the issue and all the potential alternatives, we came right back to something very similar to the original concept. In that sense, it was one more validation of the work that was done earlier.
Q: But wasn't it too long? Was such a long process really necessary?
A: It's not for us to say whether all that was necessary. It took eight months, and that's just another part of the realities of this whole initiative. To put things in a little bit of perspective, we've had other, very complex, things that we've done within this alliance. The journey from the San Francisco Treaty to the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security included a lot of very challenging aspects. The reversion of Okinawa also required extensive and repeated negotiations, and we succeeded there.
A more recent example--and others can judge the relative complexity--is the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA), and the redefinition of situations in areas surrounding Japan as being subject specific and not geographically determined. All of these things were quite challenging.
The advances that we've made within the alliance, especially in recent years, are impressive. For some examples, recall the Self-Defense Forces' participation in global peacekeeping operations. They have operated in Timor L'este, Cambodia, the Golan Heights and Iraq. Japanese forces operate now in the counter-piracy patrols. Ten or 15 years ago conventional wisdom said that was impossible.
Japan is a major contributor to our efforts in Afghanistan, with resources and expertise. We should pause, just every once in a while, to remember what we've accomplished and that we've accomplished some very difficult things in the past.
It shows the adaptiveness of the alliance. It shows its relevance to current situations well beyond the Cold War concept. So, I remain an optimist. Yes, we're working through a lot of very complex issues now. But, we'll get there.
Q: What's the way ahead for the base realignment agreement? What should the Japanese and U.S. governments do? "Stay the course," including the decision on the configuration of the FRF at the upcoming Two Plus Two meeting?
A: My former colleagues would not be happy if I was to comment on what should or should not be discussed at the upcoming Two Plus Two and things.
Q: You're now a civilian and free to talk.
A: I can't comment on the specifics that will be discussed at the Two Plus Two. I know that our government is in detailed discussions with the Japanese government on how to work through all the things that are "on our plate" now.
But to your general question about "stay the course," the kind of naval or aviation metaphor that that brings up is, yes, "stay the course," but don't "drive into the middle of a typhoon." You can go around storms.
Q: Detour?
A: Detour. Maybe. But ...
Q: Can you be more specific?
A: We can adjust course and speed to avoid running onto the rocks, while still maintaining progress toward the goal.
Q: Slowing down?
A: Or speed up. Depending on what we're doing. I'm not going to make a judgment either way on that. That's not my call. But while keeping the destination in mind, adjust the heading and the speed so that we can achieve things where we can achieve them, and keep moving toward the goal, without driving the ship onto the rocks.
Q: Finally a fundamental question about Okinawa, since you are the premier expert on Okinawa in the United States.
A: That's an unfair allegation. How about "No. 1 fan" instead of "No. 1 expert?"
Q: Sure. As the No. 1 fan of Okinawa, do you think the current presence of U.S. forces in Okinawa, which consists mainly of Marine corps, is really sustainable for an extended period, given all those political developments and situations? And if not, what should be done?
A: Okinawa has experienced tremendous growth. The key to our sustained presence in Okinawa for the life of the alliance remains the development of Okinawa. There are plans in the works to aid the development of education and the business climate. There is untapped potential there that can aid the entire economic situation in Japan.
The land returns are essential to development, and the alliance realignment is essential to the land returns. In addition to relocating some of the Marines to Guam, we're also consolidating what remains. We're moving from the most congested urban area to the area where it's far less congested. We're freeing up the land in the urban area for economic development, for schools, for manufacturing capabilities, for whatever the best use is.
A key to sustaining our presence not only there but throughout Japan is that we continue to make these adjustments and we continue to do our best to make the American forces in Japan productive members of the community. In that way, we can sustain our presence, to increase the work that we do on a bilateral basis with the Self-Defense Forces and that, together, we contribute to the common defense of Japan and the United States.
Q: Some people point out a scenario that if the FRF plan and the base realignment agreement could not be implemented and Marine corps and U.S. forces stayed as they are right now in Okinawa, we would eventually end up with a pullout of the Marines, especially when something really unfortunate happens, like an accident. Do you think this is a plausible assessment of the situation? That eventually the Marines may have to pull out, even if the U.S. government doesn't want to?
A: There are a lot of hypotheticals in there.
Q: Of course, there are.
A: A major reason for the relocation and the consolidation in Okinawa is to ensure we have the capability to operate, in conjunction with Japanese forces, according to agreements of the U.S. and Japanese governments, to provide for the security of Japan, the security of Asia, and also the security of the United States. We need to do it in a manner that takes the best possible care of the local population.
The Self-Defense Forces do the same thing, with their bases throughout Japan.
The predominance of the Okinawa bases are in the south. That happens to be the place of the most urban growth. We need to get out of there and relocate to places where we have a little more room. The result of our ongoing and planned realignment actions is a more effective security posture and further economic development of Okinawa Prefecture.
Q: Here is another fundamental question, but it is now about North Korea. Is it really a realistic goal to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula? Do you think North Korea will eventually give up its nuclear weapons?
A: I think it is the only goal that we can adopt. Our policy is the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, under irreversible conditions. To do otherwise, to accept the fact that North Korea will be achieving nuclear weapons, does not contribute to anybody's security.
Q: But do you really think it's going to happen?
A: There have been predictions made about North Korea on a number of occasions for the last 20 or 30 years. I think the only thing we've proven is it's very hard to predict anything in North Korea.
Q: We've seen the change of the Japan-China relationship toward the end of last year when the Senkaku incident happened. In retrospect, what did the incident tell us?
A: I think the biggest thing we can learn from not only the Senkaku incident but many activities in recent years is that one can never take the security situation for granted.
Q: That means it could deteriorate or change?
A: Meaning that there will be many challenges to security in Japan's area of the world, and that, together, Japan and the United States need to make sure that we have very carefully considered and developed strategies to ensure the security of Japan and the United States, and the region.
Q: China's anti-access/area-denial(A2/AD) capabilities. How much of a impediment do those capabilities present to the credibility of U.S. power projection capabilities? In other words, to what extent do those capabilities of China hinder the operations of the U.S. forces in the Western Pacific?
A: Historically, this is not the first challenge that's emerged to our forward presence and power projection capabilities. We've overcome similar challenges in the past.
Q: Are you talking about the challenges from the Soviet Union?
A: And many nations in the Middle East. We continue to watch China's development, as always. We continue to ask for transparency on their intentions. But, I'm confident that, while we watch these capabilities develop, that we're also looking at what we should be doing to ensure that we retain the capability to maintain our forward presence, to maintain our access, to sea, air, space and cyberspace, in support of not only our own interests but those of our allies, friends and, by the way, China's interests.
China's rise has raised millions and millions up from poverty, not only in Asia but around the world. China deserves to take full advantage of their economic potential. But China's rise was also, in large part, enabled by the international system. While we're looking to our own security, we need to make sure that we defend and support those aspects of the international system that allow for free and unfettered access to the global domains, air, sea, space, cyberspace.
Q: Is an anti-ship ballistic missile(ASBM) that China has been developing a "game changer?"
A: That's why we're looking at it. "Game changer" is probably a premature term. I am not an expert on air-sea battle management, but, in concept, it's part of the response to changing conditions around the world. As we go through this inquiry, and others, we'll determine the most promising way ahead.
Q: How much do we have to worry about the security of the global commons, including space and cyberspace? How much of a threat are we facing?
A: That's a hard question to answer. One picks up a lot of anecdotal reports in open source and in the media of cyber intrusions
Q: All in all, what do you think China is trying to do? What do you think is their strategic intention?
A: I think China's very concerned with maintaining their economic rate of growth. I think China's concerned with solving many of their internal challenges. These include providing energy, providing adequate food stocks, taking advantage of their hydroelectric power potential while still protecting the environment, all those types of things.
We have many areas where the United States agrees with China, and I believe Japan is in the same situation. We have areas where we have a disagreement. I think it's incumbent on both of us to work very hard on the areas where we agree with China, to make sure that we can get past the inevitable areas where we disagree.
Q: You think we can peacefully coexist with China?
A: Certainly.
Q: The United States and China will not eventually be on a collision course?
A: We fully intend to coexist with China. We helped sponsor their entry into the World Trade Organization. We think it's in everybody's interest to have a strong and prosperous China as a productive member of the international system and to fully leverage their economic potential around the world, for everybody's good.
China does contribute, in many ways, to common efforts. They participate, for example, in the same counter-piracy patrols that Japan supports.
Q: Tell me about the Air-Sea Battle concept. It's rather confusing. How serious is the United States about this idea?
A: I'm not the expert on Air-Sea Battle. But, in general, I will offer that we have any number of institutions within the uniformed military, any number of institutions within the Department of Defense, and others, meaning the private sector interests, the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments(CSBA) and things that are always looking at how our doctrine should change to take account of what we see as emerging capabilities that could, potentially, become a threat. We continue to watch developments around the world. There are many, many other doctrinal development, capability efforts going on all the time.
To return to the point about "freezing" situations, you can't freeze this situation either. And, technology, as we know, is advancing so rapidly. The technology on your wrist, with your watch, is much more powerful than the technology in some of the early computers. We have to continue to pay very careful attention to this. And we do. Many of these efforts include allied cooperation, to include some of the efforts that we do with Japan.
Q: Are the Air-Sea Battle concept and Japan's Dynamic Defense strategy compatible?
A: Dynamic Defense, at least the part of it that I have seen, looks (like it) makes sense for Japan. Some other doctrinal developments going on will remain to be seen.
Q: About the future of the alliance, I know Japan and the United States have been working on "deepening" the alliance, but this 3/11 disaster may require some adjustments. Can we just go on as we planned before this disaster?
A: There will be adjustments in detail, I'm quite sure. In my mind, one of the keys is that we need to make sure that we continue to move forward on all aspects of our relationship and work through all the challenges. We can't freeze the strategic situation, we can't freeze the political situation. We have to be able to move forward on all fronts. There will be tactical adjustments to accommodate various realities, but we need to keep moving forward.
Q: What do you think the impact of this disaster on Japan will be? What kind of impact will a weaker Japan, if only temporarily, have on the strategic balance and environment in the region?
A: I don't look for a weaker Japan at all out of this. There have been many commentaries made lately about the strength of the Japanese culture, in the immediate reaction to this disaster, where the people pulled together, were helping each other. We have reports of relief supplies being delivered to a number of Japanese trapped in the destroyed area here. The people that are to receive the supplies say: "No, we're fine. We have enough. Take it down the road. There are more people down the road." This is a demonstration of the tremendous capabilities of the Japanese society.
We've seen this before, and it is a real strength. I expect we'll see the same thing, the same pulling together, the same common cause, as we rebuild this area, as we rehabilitate the nuclear industry, as we rehabilitate the power industry. This will have a tremendous effect on re-energizing the views of Japan.
Q: You don't subscribe to the "weaker Japan" theory?
A: I do not subscribe to the "weaker Japan" theory. Not at all. I think this disaster, as bad as it is, and the tragic loss of life, will be honored only if we emerge from this better and stronger in the future, and that's the Japan that I see.
Q: After this disaster, we see Russian airplanes coming into the Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone and Chinese aircraft flying close to Japanese surface combatants. Are they testing Japan? What are they doing?
A: As I said, one cannot freeze the strategic situation, or the political situation, while we concentrate on this (disaster). We need to be able to do everything. Japan is a tremendously accomplished nation, with a very large economy, despite rumors to the contrary lately. Japan owns its own public debt. Japan's got a tremendous reservoir of personal savings. There are advantages here that can lead to a renaissance.
Q: Is our deterrence capability less because Japan and the U.S. are concentrating on these HA/DR operations?
A: No.
Q: What kind of a role is India going to play in making and maintaining the regional strategic balance in the Asia-Pacific?
A: A tremendously developing economy, they are very concerned about security in their part of the world, the Indian Ocean area. They have a "look east" policy.
I know that a number of Japanese business interests are very keen on working with Indian business interests. There have been many Japanese executives traveling to India.
Q: Security-wise?
A: Indeed. It's natural that, if economic interests develop, that security interests will follow.
India is and can increasingly be a net contributor to the common good, the common defense, and to developing economies in the region.
Q: To balance China?
A: Not necessary balance China. India also does business with China.
Q: With regard to India, I have often come across the term "Indo-Pacific" recently in Washington. Is that a relevant geopolitical notion, in addition to Asia-Pacific?
A: I wouldn't put these concepts into opposition.
Q: Indo-Pacific was your area of responsibility as assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs.
A: It was. One needs to look only at the energy line of communications to see how much the Indian Ocean region affects things in East Asia.
Q: Afghanistan was part of your area of responsibility, as well. After the United States pulls out its forces, can American people feel safe at home without worrying about terrorist attacks?
A: The transition of security responsibilities to the Afghans should be beginning this summer. There will be a measured transition for a number of years. We're in discussions with our Afghan partners there on what support Afghanistan will require from the United States in the future. Many things are on the table. Many things have yet to be decided. Walking away from Afghanistan is not my recommendation. We did that in 1989, and that didn't work out too well for us.
Q: You are against the pullout of forces?
A: I am against abandoning Afghanistan. We will be adjusting forces. As Afghan capability develops, the Afghan National Army and the various varieties of the Afghan National Law Enforcement develop, as their government develops, as their economy develops, the situation will change. America's direct involvement in security operations in Afghanistan will decrease, America's support for Afghanistan in other areas should come up, and we should remain partners with Afghan development efforts the future.
I think we should always make sure that we improve all aspects of our security situation, both locally and beyond. The term "pullout" implies a sudden departure, close the door, put a lock on it, put a sign on the door that says: "It's been nice. Good luck."
That's not the intention. It's very much a development of Afghan capabilities, to allow a subsequent modification to the capabilities that we provide. In the future, our involvement in their security situation should be more support, less direct involvement, and hopefully that will lead to an Afghanistan that is peaceful, prosperous, and a productive member of the community.
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Wallace Gregson is former U.S. assistant secretary of defense.
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