Ex-Fukushima gov. blames headstrong energy policy for nuclear crisis
The latest crisis at the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant was caused not by a natural disaster, but by the national government's nuclear energy program, former Fukushima Gov. Eisaku Sato said in an interview with the Mainichi.
In 2002, following revelations of a company cover-up of problems with its nuclear reactors, then Fukushima Gov. Sato, now 71, retracted permission that had been previously given to Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) to use plutonium and uranium mixed oxide (MOX) fuel in its reactors. As the incident suggests, Sato was vocal about his doubts toward the national government's nuclear energy program during his gubernatorial tenure from 1988 to 2006, but even he believed that the now-stricken nuclear power plant -- currently at the center of what TEPCO has repeatedly called an "unprecedented" state of affairs -- was safe.
"The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) claimed that they were 'double- and triple-checking' for safety, and maintained that there was 'no risk' of a nuclear accident caused by a natural disaster. Considering how far the ministry went in its claims concerning safety, it's only natural that local communities believed them," Sato said.
When accidents and scandals at the Fukushima No. 1 and No. 2 nuclear power plants came to light years earlier, however, Sato had questioned the state of safety control at the plants.
"Legislators and prefectural governments hosting power plants have no say in national nuclear energy policy. The majority of those comprising the subcommittee for long-term planning at the Atomic Energy Commission of Japan have cozy relationships with those in the electric power industry.
"Bureaucrats at METI are the ones who actually devise policy. Whether the policy is good or bad is irrelevant to them. All they care about is carrying out a plan and never backtracking once a decision has been made."
Asked about recent debates over the possibility of breaking off the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) from METI, Sato argued that it was imperative.
"Between 2002 and 2006, there were 21 cases of nuclear power plant-related problems reported to the Fukushima Prefectural Government by TEPCO insiders. These whistle blowers feared that the information they supplied to NISA would go unaddressed and leak straight to TEPCO," Sato said. "It's been pointed out that the safety of nuclear power plants has only been checked and confirmed on the premise that they will go into operation, and that's because NISA is a part of METI."
As for the trace amounts of plutonium that have recently been detected on the grounds of the Fukushima No. 1 Nuclear Power Plant, Sato said that they may have come from MOX fuel being used in the plant's No. 3 reactor.
"Some experts had raised safety concerns over pluthermal power generation, but the government just pushed through with its plans," he said.
While the latest crisis has rocked the public's confidence in the nation's nuclear energy program, there is no doubt that the program has brought jobs to many local residents. Sato said he recognized that eliminating nuclear power plants would strip communities of employment, but also suggested that we take a close look at the town of Futaba, where the No. 1 power station is located.
"It was believed that with the establishment of a nuclear power plant within its borders, Futaba would flourish to the end of time. But immediately after the plant was built, the national government began taking steps to build two more reactors there. The town received preferential financial treatment in return, but by 2009, it was deemed in need of swift financial revitalization, and restrictions were placed on how it could handle its funds," Sato said. "We need to take a coolheaded approach when weighing the pros and cons of hosting nuclear power plants."
With TEPCO's announcement that the No. 1 through 4 reactors at the Fukushima No. 1 plant will be decommissioned, the question that has emerged is whether the No. 5 and No. 6 reactors at the plant and the reactors at the nearby No. 2 plant should resume operations. Sato isn't sure what the right answer is.
"I still haven't made up my mind about whether the No. 2 plant should be running again. A nuclear power plant requires an investment of 1 trillion yen per site, and what we decide to do with the No. 2 plant cuts to the very heart of our energy policy."
(Mainichi Japan) April 5, 2011
「天災ではない」佐藤栄佐久・前知事
今回の原発事故を「国の体質が引き起こした」と指摘する佐藤栄佐久氏＝福島県郡山市の佐藤氏の自宅で、松本惇撮影
福島県知事在職中に、国の原子力政策に疑問を投げかけていた佐藤栄佐久氏（７１）に、東京電力福島第１原子力発電所の事故について聞いた。佐藤氏は「深刻な事態は国の原子力政策が招いたもので、天災によるものではない」と強調した。【岩佐淳士、松本惇】
－－未曽有の事故に、東京電力は「想定外の事態」と繰り返した。
◆私でさえ安全と思っていた。経済産業省は「二重三重のチェックをしている」「自然災害による事故も絶対あり得ない」と言っていた。国がそれだけ言えば、地域社会が信用するのは当然だった。
－－８８～０６年の知事在任時、福島第１、第２原発で事故やトラブル隠しが発覚。安全管理に疑問を唱えていた。
◆原子力政策は、国会議員や福島のような立地県もタッチできない。政策の基本を定める長期計画策定会議のメンバーの大半は電力関係者の「味方」。政策を実際につくるのは経産省の官僚だ。彼らにとって、良いのか悪いのかは別問題で、一度方針を決めると後戻りしない体質だ。
－－原子力安全・保安院の経産省からの分離が検討されている。
◆分離しないといけない。０２～０６年に原発トラブルなどに絡んだ内部告発が、県に２１通も寄せられた。保安院に情報提供しても対応もせずに東電へ情報が流されると、告発者は恐れていた。原発の運転を前提に安全面をチェックしろと指示してきたと指摘されるのも、保安院が経産省の一組織だからだ。
－－第１原発敷地内からは、微量のプルトニウムも検出された。
◆３号機で使用中のプルトニウム・ウラン混合酸化物（ＭＯＸ）燃料から出た可能性もある。プルサーマルは、専門家から安全性に懸念の声もあったが、国は推進してきた。
－－多くの住民が原発関連の仕事に従事してきた現実もある。
◆原発のない町に帰っても働く場もないという問題は確かにある。ただ、第１原発がある双葉町を見てほしい。原発ができて永久に栄えると思っていたが、すぐに２機増設してほしいという話が出た。財政上の優遇もあったが、０９年には自主的な財政運営が制限される「早期健全化団体」に転落した。原発立地の損得を、冷静に考えるべきだと思う。
－－東電は、第１原発１～４号機の廃炉を表明した。５、６号機や第２原発はどう扱うべきか。
◆第２原発を再稼働させるべきかどうか、まだ自分の中で整理ができていない。原発は１カ所の立地点で１兆円の投資となる。原発の扱いは、エネルギー政策の根幹にかかわる問題だから。
【略歴】さとう・えいさく 日本青年会議所副会頭などを経て８３年参院議員、８８年に福島県知事。５期目途中の０６年県発注工事を巡る汚職事件が表面化し、同１０月に収賄容疑で逮捕された。無罪主張しているが１審、２審では有罪判決が出て、上告中。０２年の東京電力の原発トラブル隠し問題では、原発立地県の知事として、プルサーマル計画への「事前了解」を白紙撤回した。
◆福島第１原発と佐藤栄佐久氏◆
７１年３月 福島第１原発１号機が営業運転開始
８８年９月 佐藤栄佐久氏が福島県知事に初当選
９８年１１月 県と地元２町が福島第１原発３号機でのプルサーマル計画受け入れを表明
０２年８月 東京電力の原発トラブル隠し発覚
９月 佐藤氏がプルサーマル計画への事前了解を白紙撤回
０３年１２月 福島、新潟、福井の３県知事が原子力安全・保安院の経済産業省からの分離を国に要請
０６年９月 県発注工事を巡る談合事件で実弟らが逮捕された道義的責任を取り、知事を辞職
１０月 佐藤氏が県発注工事を巡る収賄容疑で逮捕される
１０年８月 福島県がプルサーマル計画受け入れ表明
１０月 福島第１原発３号機でプルサーマル発電による営業運転を開始
１１年３月 東日本大震災発生
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